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Highlights 
Recent developments have emphasised transparency, effectiveness and 
evaluation and few aspects of regional aid control have been immune 
from change. 
Assisted area coverage is, in principle, set for the period to 2020. 
However, the Commission is set to assess whether any further areas 
TXDOLI\DVµD¶UHJLRQVLQ 
Evaluation plans are an important requirement in the new framework, but 
it remains to be seen what the impact of these will be on the future of the 
schemes in question.  
Fewer aid schemes will be subject to direct scrutiny by the Commission 
since the scope of the GBER has been broadened. However, the 
implementation of the GBER has not been trouble-free. 
The relationship between the definition of State aid and regional aid 
control remains troublesome. 
$LG WR ODUJH HQWHUSULVHV LQ µF¶ DUHDV UHPDLQV D FRQWHQWLRXV LVVXH IRU
some, with the GBER provisions proving complex to implement.  
Reducing levels of regional aid to large firms has long been a 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSULRULW\However, comparisons with US spending suggest 
that European governments may be considerably less profligate in their 
use of subsidies to firms than is frequently supposed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
State aid control is completing its move to a new phase of development. In 2014 the Commission 
largely finished its reform programme, the State aid modernisation (SAM) initiative. This placed new 
emphasis on transparency, effectiveness and evaluation, recast the basis for the assessment and 
FRPSOLDQFH RI 6WDWH DLG DFURVV D UDQJH RI SROLF\ DUHDV DQG IXUWKHU LQFUHDVHG WKH µVHOI-SROLFLQJ¶
element of State aid discipline. The main element of the reform package not (yet) achieved is the 
DGRSWLRQRID&RPPXQLFDWLRQRQWKHµQRWLRQ¶RI6WDWHDLG 
The reform agenda has been wide-ranging, and few aspects of regional aid control have been 
immune from change. The approval of all the assisted area maps by the European Commission or 
the EFTA Surveillance Authority under the 2014-20 Regional Aid Guidelines (RAG) provided the basis 
for the introduction of new aid schemes mainly on the basis of the 2014-20 General Block Exemption 
Regulation (GBER). The last year or so has seen the implementation of regional aid schemes on the 
basis of these new rules. 
The new RAG and GBER place further constraints on the use of regional aid, particularly in terms of 
the use of regional aid to large firms in the so-FDOOHGµF¶DUHDV)RUVRPH0HPEHU6WDWHVWhis is an 
important policy change, with direct implications for the conduct of regional policy; for others there is 
limited impact since large firms rarely received regional aid anyway and have not traditionally been 
the target of policy.  
Fewer aid schemes will be subject to direct scrutiny by the Commission since the scope of the GBER 
has been broadened to encompass measures with which the Commission considered it had had 
sufficient experience and could exempt. However, the implementation of the GBER has not been 
trouble-free: Commissioner Vestager has noted that almost a third of cases reported on the basis of 
WKH*%(5KDYHµLVVXHV¶JLYHQWKDWWKH&RPPLVVLRQH[SHFWVXSWRSHUFHQWRIDLGPHDVXUHVWREH
covered by the GBER, this is a significant error rate. In addition, uncertainties among domestic 
SROLF\PDNHUVKDYHOHG'*&RPSHWLWLRQWRSURGXFHDUHVSRQVHWRµ)UHTXHQWO\$VNHG4XHVWLRQV¶WKLV
runs to some 42 pages ± more than half the length of the Regulation itself. However, not only does 
this document fail to address all the interpretation questions raised (only the most common ones to 
date), but it is also not binding on the Commission as an institution.  
An important development in the recent State aid reforms has been the emphasis on evaluation. 
Under both the RAG and the GBER, approval of regional aid schemes can be subject to evaluation 
plans negotiated with the Commission. Under the GBER, this applies where the estimated annual 
EXGJHWH[FHHGV¼PLOOLRQ)RUVRPHFRXQWULHVWKLVOLPLWLVZHOODERve likely regional aid spend, but 
for others there have been sometimes intense negotiations over the type of evaluation that should be 
undertaken. In due course, the outcome of evaluations may have direct implications for the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRH[tend approval of the schemes concerned. 
The definition of State aid remains an issue for many ± in fact, in some policy areas, the GBER seems 
to bring measures within the ambit of State aid that some domestic policymakers had not hitherto 
considered to involve aid at all, blurring the distinction between the presence of aid and the 
compatibility RIDLGZLWKWKH7UHDW\7KHQRWLFHRQWKHµQRWLRQRI6WDWHDLG¶UHPDLQVLQGUDIWIRUPEXW
while the new Commissioner has decided to reflect on this issue, she has also signalled her intention 
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to propose a Communication for adoption by the Commission. In parallel, and related, a working 
group on designing infrastructure projects that do not raise issues under State Aid Law is being 
established by DG Competition. Meanwhile, a number of cases have begun to shed some light on the 
views of the Commission as to where the edges of the definition lie. 
5HFHQWGHYHORSPHQWVLQUHJLRQDODLGKDYHEHHQFKDUDFWHULVHGE\DGHJUHHRIµEHGGLQJLQ¶$OWKRXJK
substantial changes have taken place, some unresolved issues remain, and there is a degree of 
dissatisfaction with the parameters and demands of the new GBER. The aim of this paper is to 
provide an overview and update of regional aid control issues as Member State introduce measures 
and adapt to the new regime. Section 2 takes stock of the progress with implementing regional aid 
XQGHUWKHQHZUXOHVUHYLHZLQJDPRQJRWKHUWKLQJVWKHXSWDNHRIWKH*%(5DQGWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V
emerging stance on evaluations, as well as some recent developments in the definition of State aid. 
Section 3 reflects on the changes to treatment of regional aid to large firms, reviewing both the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VUHVSRQVHWR³)$4V´RQWKH*%(5DQGSDVWSDWWHUQV of aid to large projects. Section 4 
concludes by highlighting some questions and issues for discussion.  
Annexed to the paper are: (i) a brief outline of the main features of the recent reforms in relation to 
regional aid, providing a reference point on some of the key changes discussed in the body of the 
paper, aid rates and assisted area coverage across countries; (ii) copies of the available assisted 
area maps approved in 2014; (iii) a listing the schemes known to have been reported under GBER 
2014 to date. 
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2. TAKING STOCK OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS  
Against the backdrop of the major changes to the legislative context summarised in ANNEX I: pour 
memoire ± key changes in regional aid control 2014-20 v 2007-13, this section takes stock of recent 
developments largely resulting from the new regulatory context. 
2.1 Assisted area coverage 
2.1.1 Assisted area maps changes 
Two countries have made small amendments to their assisted area maps within the last year. In both 
cases, a small population reserve had been left to deal with unforeseen circumstances. In France, this 
DPRXQWHGWRWZRSHUFHQWRIWKHµF¶SRSXODWLRQLQ)LQODQGWKHUHVHUYHDPRXQWHGSHUFHQWRIWKH
national population. 
In Finland the regions of Viitasaari-Pihtipudas and Äänekoski (representing 1.7 percent of the 
population coverage) have been added to Aid Area 2 on the basis of their employment-related 
socioeconomic indicators. The decision by the ministerial group to extend the support area was taken 
in November 2014 and approved by the Commission in April 2015 (see annex II: national assisted 
area maps 2014-20 for amended map). 
Viitasaari-Pihtipudas and Äänekoski were designated on the basis of high unemployment and as it 
was considered they would benefit from higher aid levels especially in connection with the bio- 
production facility planned in Äänekoski, which in turn is expected to accelerate the investments in the 
supply chain and other businesses.  
In June 2015, the Commission approved the extension of the regional aid map for France using 26 
percent of the population reserve of 233,757 inhabitants. This concerns five municipalities in 
Burgundy and one in Champagne-Ardenne as non-SUHGHILQHGµF¶DUHDVLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK&ULWHULRQ
of RAG 2014-20. Criterion 1 concerns contiguous areas of at least 100,000 inhabitants located in 
NUTS 2 or NUTS 3 regions that have a GDP per capita below or equal to the EU-27 average, or an 
unemployment rate of 115 percent or more of the national average. All municipalities involved have a 
GDP below the EU-27 average, and belong to a larger zone of more than 100,000 inhabitants (the 
municipality in Champagne-Ardenne is part of an assisted area with 845,108 inhabitants, the five in 
Burgundy are part of an area with 124,562 inhabitants). 
2.1.2 5HYLHZRIµD¶DUHDVLQ 
It is worth recalling that RAG 2014-20 makes provision for a limited review of assisted area coverage 
in 2016.1 Specifically, the Commission will establish whether any NUTS 2 region which is not listed as 
DQµD¶UHJLRn in Annex I to the Guidelines has GDP per capita below 75 percent of the EU28 average. 
This will use the most recent data available at the time and will be based on the three-year average. 
The Commission will publish a Communication on the results, but the impact of these results is not 
entirely clear. RAG 2014-QRWHVWKDWWKH&RPPLVVLRQZLOO³HVWDEOLVKDWWKDWPRPHQWZKHWKHUWKHVH
                                                   
1
 RAG 2014-20, para 183-5. 
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LGHQWLILHG DUHDV PD\ EHFRPH HOLJLEOH IRU UHJLRQDO DLG XQGHU $UWLFOH D«´ ZKLFK LPSOLHV D
degree of discretion on the part of the Commission, irrespective of the outcome of the analysis.  
Also unclear, is the impact on existing assisted areas: 
 ³LIWKHVHLGHQWLILHGDUHDVDUHGHVLJQDWHGHLWKHUDVSUH-GHILQHGµF¶DUHDVRUDVQRQ-predefined 
µF¶ DUHDV LQ WKH QDWLRQDO UHJLRQDO DLG PDS« WKH SHUFHQWDJH RI WKH VSHFLILF DOORFDWLRQ IRU µF¶
DUHDV LQGLFDWHG LQ $QQH[ ,ZLOO EHDGMXVWHGDFFRUGLQJO\«$0HPEHU 6WDWHPD\ZLWKLQ WKH
OLPLWRILWVDGMXVWHGVSHFLILFDOORFDWLRQIRUµF¶DUHDVDPHQGWKHOLVWRIµF¶DUHDVFRQWDLQHGLQLWV
regional aid map for the period from 1 January 2017 to December 2020. These amendments 
PD\QRWH[FHHGSHUFHQWRIHDFK0HPEHU6WDWHV¶DGMXVWHGµF¶FRYHUDJH´ 
7KLVFDQEHUHDGDVVXJJHVWLQJWKDWFKDQJHVWRµF¶DUHDVDUHRQO\RSHQWR0HPEHU6WDWHVZKHUHWKHUH
KDYHEHHQFKDQJHVLQµD¶UHJLRQFRYHUDJHKRZHYHULIWKLVLVVRLWLVXQFOHDUZK\FKDQJHVWRµF¶DUHD
coverage are so restrictive. 
'HVLJQDWLRQRIµD¶UHJLRQVIRU-20 was based on GDP data for 2008-10. Regional GDP data are 
currently available in Eurostat to 2013 for many but not all countries. It seems probable that the 
UHDVVHVVPHQWRIµD¶UHJLRQFRYHUDJHZLOOEHEDVHGRQ-13, or possibly 2012-14 data. 
As well as changes in the economic situation, the new GDP data will also be based on a different 
methodology ± ESA 2010, as opposed to ESA 95.2 The main changes in the methodology relate to 
the capitalisation of expenditure on research and development and on weapons; this expenditure is 
now counted as investment. As well as revised concepts and definitions, ESA 2010 also incorporates 
VWDWLVWLFDOµLPSURYHPHQWV¶VXFKDVWKHLQWHJUDWLRQRIQHZRUXSGDWHGVRXUFHVDQGEHWWHUPHDVXUHPHQW
for instance of the way in which illegal activities are accounted for in GDP.3 For the EU28, 
methodological changes revised 2010 GDP upwards by 2.3 percent, of which the bulk (1.9 percent) is 
accounted for by the capitalisation of R&D expenditure. At country level, the impact is variable. 
Methodological changes had the most impact in Sweden and Finland where 2010 GDP increased by 
4.4 percent and 4.2 percent, respectively (in each case 4 percent being due to the capitalisation of 
R&D). The largest changes resulting from statistical improvements were in Cyprus (8.4 percent) and 
the Netherlands (5.9 percent).  
These changes carry through to the regional level: in the majority of cases (240 NUTS II regions)4 
there is an increase in GDP; in 31 regions there is a decrease; and in the remaining nine, there is no 
change. However, the regional differences are more extreme than those at national level: in 11 
regions the change results in a fall in GDP per capita of more than two percent.  
                                                   
2
 The change in methodology is worldwide ± ESA 2010 is the European counterpart of the 2008 SNA adopted by 
the United Nations Statistical Commission and already implemented in the USA, Australia and Canada. 
3
 First estimation of European aggregates based on ESA 2010, Eurostat newsrelease 154/2014 of 17 October 
2014 
4
 Including the Norwegian NUTS II regions. 
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Figure 1: Negative Impact of ESA 2010 on GDP(PPS) per head 2011 
  ESA 95 ESA 2010 % Change 
PT Região Autónoma da Madeira 24900 20100 -19.3 
EL Dytiki Makedonia 20000 17200 -14.0 
NL Zeeland 31000 27300 -11.9 
EL Notio Aigaio 22300 20800 -6.7 
EL Ionia Nisia  18900 18100 -4.2 
EL Sterea Ellada 18100 17400 -3.9 
NL Friesland 26300 25400 -3.4 
ES La Rioja 27200 26500 -2.6 
EL Kriti 17300 16900 -2.3 
ES Cantabria 23500 23000 -2.1 
BG Yugoiztochen 9500 9300 -2.1 
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat data. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, a number of regions see an uplift in GDP per head of over nine 
percent. 
Figure 2: Positive Impact of ESA 2010 on GDP(PPS) per head 2011 
  ESA 95 ESA 2010 % Change 
FR Champagne-Ardenne 23200 25300 9.1 
NL Gelderland 27200 29700 9.2 
NL Zuid-Holland 32000 35000 9.4 
UK Hampshire and Isle of Wight 25600 28000 9.4 
IT Provincia Autonoma di Trento 30500 33900 11.1 
IT Liguria 26700 29700 11.2 
RO Bucuresti - Ilfov 30700 34300 11.7 
IT Lazio 29300 33100 13.0 
NL Flevoland 23600 26900 14.0 
BE Prov. Brabant Wallon 29800 34100 14.4 
NL Noord-Holland 36600 42600 16.4 
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat data. 
Looking towards the mid-WHUP UHYLHZRI µD¶ UHJLRQVWDWXV LQGLFDWLRQV IURPGDWDDUH WKDWVRPH
DGGLWLRQDOUHJLRQVZRXOGTXDOLI\DVµD¶UHJLRQVFRPSDUHGWRWKHRXWFRPHSUHVHQWHGLQ5$*-20.5 
The countries potentially affected would be Greece, Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom (see Figure 
3): 
x ,Q*UHHFHIRXUUHJLRQVZKLFKGRQRWFXUUHQWO\KDYH µD¶VWDWXVIDOOZHOOEHORZWKHSHUFHQW
threshold on the basis of 2011-13 data.  
x In Spain, Andalucía and Melilla would qualify. 
x In Italy, Molise and Sardegna appear likely to be below 75 percent in the qualifying period. 
x In the United Kingdom, Tees Valley falls well under the threshold based on 2011-13 data,  
while South Yorkshire and Lincolnshire appear to be close to the cut-off.  
Interestingly, there is only one region, JihovêFKRG&=ZKLFKDSSHDUVWRKDYHµRXWJURZQ¶ µD¶UHJLRQ
status ± though RAG 2014-GRHVQRWHQYLVDJHFKDQJHVWRFXUUHQWµD¶UHJLRQV 
                                                   
5
 RAG 2014-20, Annex I. 
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Figure 3: NUTS I,UHJLRQVDQGµD¶VWDWXV*'3-PPS per head % of EU average >60%<80%) 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Status 
SK Stredné Slovensko 58 57 60 57 58 60 µD¶ 
EL Peloponnisos  73 75 69 62 59 60 µD¶ 
IT Calabria : : : 61 60 57 µD¶ 
LV Latvija 60 53 53 56 60 64 µD¶ 
EL Kriti 81 81 74 65 61 63  
PL Lódzkie 51 55 57 59 61 63 µD¶ 
HR Kontinentalna Hrvatska 64 63 60 61 62 62 µD¶ 
PT Norte 63 65 66 63 62 64 µD¶ 
IT Sicilia : : : 65 63 61 µD¶ 
CZ Severozápad 63 66 63 64 63 62 µD¶ 
IT Campania : : : 63 63 63 µD¶ 
IT Puglia : : : 65 64 61 µD¶ 
EL Dytiki Makedonia 81 85 75 66 64 62  
EL Sterea Ellada 83 82 75 67 64 62  
ES Extremadura 70 71 69 66 64 65 µD¶ 
PL Pomorskie 52 58 59 61 64 65 µD¶ 
FR Réunion 67 68 67 66 65 66 µD¶ 
PT Centro (PT) 66 69 69 66 65 67 µD¶ 
HU Nyugat-Dunántúl 61 61 65 67 66 67 µD¶ 
UK West Wales and The Valleys 68 69 67 66 66 67 µD¶ 
CZ Strední Morava 64 66 65 67 67 67 µD¶ 
CZ Severovýchod 66 68 67 68 68 68 µD¶ 
EL Ionia Nisia 91 88 82 70 68 68  
SI Vzhodna Slovenija 74 70 68 69 68 68 µD¶ 
IT Basilicata : : : 72 69 69 µD¶ 
PT Região Autónoma dos Açores 71 74 74 71 69 71 µD¶ 
LT Lietuva 63 57 60 65 69 73 µD¶ 
PL Slaskie 58 64 66 69 70 70 µD¶ 
UK Cornwall and Isles of Scilly 76 75 71 66 70 70 µD¶ 
PT Alentejo 72 73 74 71 70 72 µD¶ 
PL Wielkopolskie 58 64 65 67 70 73 µD¶ 
CZ Moravskoslezsko 68 68 67 71 71 69 µD¶ 
ES Andalucía 78 77 74 72 71 70  
ES Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla 82 82 77 74 71 70  
SK Západné Slovensko 68 67 68 69 71 71 µD¶ 
EE Eesti 68 62 63 68 71 73 µD¶ 
UK Tees Valley and Durham 78 78 75 72 71 73  
FR Guadeloupe 70 73 73 73 72 72 µD¶ 
CZ Jihozápad 69 73 72 72 72 73 µD¶ 
PT Região Autónoma da Madeira 79 80 79 77 72 74 µD¶ 
IT Sardegna : : : 75 73 69  
FR Martinique 72 74 75 74 73 75 µD¶ 
BG Yugozapaden 72 74 74 74 74 72 µD¶ 
CZ Strední Cechy 76 75 72 75 74 73 µD¶ 
PL Dolnoslaskie 59 64 70 73 74 76 µD¶ 
IT Molise : : : 77 75 70  
UK South Yorkshire 80 81 78 74 75 76  
EL Notio Aigaio 105 102 93 80 76 76  
ES Castilla-la Mancha 83 82 79 77 76 76  
UK Lincolnshire 80 78 76 76 76 76  
CZ Jihovýchod 73 75 73 75 76 77 µD¶ 
PT Algarve 83 82 80 77 76 79  
ES Región de Murcia 85 84 81 77 77 77  
ES Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta 87 88 83 79 77 77  
BE Prov. Luxembourg : 78 79 80 78 77  
BE Prov. Hainaut : 76 77 79 78 78  
UK Lancashire 86 85 81 78 78 79  
UK Shropshire and Staffordshire 84 81 79 78 79 80  
UK East Yorks and North Lincs 88 91 86 79 80 81 
 Source: Eurostat and RAG 2014-20, Annex I. 
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2.2 Uptake of the GBER and Notifications under RAG 
Recent changes to the regional aid rules have expanded the scope of the GBER to enable a wider 
range of schemes simply to be reported rather than requiring prior approval. The key extensions in 
relation to regional aid concern specific types of operating aid and ad hoc aid that otherwise meets 
the GBER conditions.  
GBER 2014-20 extends the block exemption to cover types of operating aid that had been routinely 
approved under RAG 2007-13.6 However, not all operating aid schemes will fall within the GBER and 
those excluded will be assessed under RAG 2014-20. Operating aid under the GBER falls into two 
main groups: 
x Transport aid in sparsely-populated areas and OMR 
x Operating aid other than transport costs in the OMR only 
Figure 4: Operating aid covered by the GBER 
 
Eligibility criteria Eligible areas 
Additional transport costs Outward transport within the Member State Sparsely-populated areas 
OMR 
Inward transport within the Member State OMR 
Other operating aid Aid amount not exceeding: 
x 15% of GVA 
x 25% of annual labour costs 
x 10% of annual turnover 
OMR  
Source: GBER, Article 15. 
The extension of the GBER to include ad hoc aid that otherwise meets the criteria of the GBER may 
IDFLOLWDWHWKHXVHRIµSDFNDJHV¶RIVXSSRUWRIIHUHGE\GLIIHUHQWDJHQFLHVWRDVLQJOHSURMHFW,QDGGLWLRQ
in Poland, regional aid DZDUGVZHUHPDGHRQWKHEDVLVRILQGLYLGXDOµRUGLQDQFHV¶ZKLFKZHUHWUHDWHG
as ad hoc aid and notifiable to the Commission under GBER 2008-13 for assessment under RAG 
2007-13. Under GBER 2014-20, such awards fall within the scope of the block exemption. However, 
WKHµLQFHQWLYHHIIHFW¶FULWHULRQLVUHODWLYHO\GHPDQGLQJIRUad hoc regional aid to large firms insofar as 
the Member State must verify that the project would not have been carried out in the area concerned 
or would not have been sufficiently profitable for the beneficiary in the area concerned in the absence 
of aid.7 Whilst domestic policymakers might want to assure themselves that proposed aid would have 
VXFKDQHIIHFWEHLQJDEOHWRµYHULI\¶WKLVLVTXLWHGHPDQGLQJ7KHUHTXLUHPHQWVIRUµLQFHQWLYH HIIHFW¶DUH
less onerous in the case of aid schemes (although the Commission had initially sought more stringent 
terms), so domestic policymakers would have an interest in only offering such aid within aid schemes. 
2.2.1 Regional aid under the GBER ± the picture so far 
GBER 2014-20 places considerable emphasis on transparency and reinforces the obligations on 
Member States in information provision. Indeed, by June 2016, Member States are to have a 
comprehensive State aid website at national or regional level providing: 
x summary information on each exempted aid measure in the standardised format (or a link to 
it); 
                                                   
6
 GBER 2014-20, Article 15. 
7
 GBER 2014-20, Article 6(3)(a). 
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x full text of each exempted measure or a link to it 
x LQIRUPDWLRQRQHDFKLQGLYLGXDODZDUGH[FHHGLQJ¼ 
At present, it appears that most national authorities are some way from providing such 
FRPSUHKHQVLYH LQIRUPDWLRQ VRXUFHV 0RUHRYHU WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V GDWDEDVH RI FDVHV ZKLFK VKRXOG
provide easy access all GBER 2014-20 exempted schemes, has apparently faced technical problems 
with the result that it is not yet straightforward to identify all relevant aid measures. 
By August 2015, some 911 schemes had been reported by EU Member State under GBER 2014-20, 
with a further 52 by the EFTA countries. Only Bulgaria and Greece (and Lichtenstein) appear not to 
have reported schemes on the basis of the block exemption.8 
Figure 5: Number of schemes reported under GBER 2014-20 (at August 2015) 
Austria 66 Latvia 10 
Belgium 12 Lithuania 9 
Bulgaria 0 Luxembourg 1 
Croatia 4 Malta 4 
Cyprus 3 Netherlands 50 
Czech Republic 63 Poland 32 
Denmark 12 Portugal 3 
Estonia 10 Romania 8 
Finland 20 Slovakia 3 
France 37 Slovenia 9 
Germany 238 Spain 70 
Greece 0 Sweden 13 
Hungary 58 United Kingdom 79 
Ireland 10 Iceland 1 
Italy 87 Norway 51 
Source: DG COMP database: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?clear=1&policy_area_id=3  
and EFTA Surveillance Authority State aid register: http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/  
In the specific context of regional aid, the way in which schemes have been reported ± typically 
covering a wide range of policy objectives within a given measure ± makes it quite difficult to assess 
the real extent to which the regional aid provisions are being used, or the budgets being allocated 
specifically to regional aid schemes. Schemes that have been reported under GBER 2014-20 to date 
and include regional investment aid9 are listed in Annex III. In many countries this reveals a number of 
schemes where clearly the regional aid element is minor or incidental, as well as a wide range of 
budget allocations and schemes offered by various tiers of government within countries. As a result, 
this listing includes a number of measures that regional policymakers would not regard as falling 
within their portfolio, as well as major regional aid schemes, some of which are substantial enough to 
have been caught by the evaluation plan requirement, which discussed further below.  
2QHLQWHUHVWLQJSRLQW WRQRWH LV WKH µXPEUHOOD¶DSSURDFKWDNHQWR*%(5FRYHU LQDIHZ LQVWDQFHV ,Q
)UDQFHDQGLQWKH8.DLGµIUDPHZRUNV¶KDYHEHHQUHSRUWHGXQGHUWKH*%(5SURYiding cover for aid 
schemes operated by different tiers of government. The advantage of this approach lies having a 
single text which (assuming it is implemented accurately) provides a secure single legal basis under 
which a range of agencies can offer aid without a proliferation of legal bases and weblinks. On the 
                                                   
8
 Clearly there is a potential timing issue here and these totals may not accord with national records depending 
on possible delays in including reports within the DG COMP database. 
9
 GBER 2014-20, Article 14. 
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other hand, reporting is still required by all those availing themselves of GBER cover; the coordination 
of this across multiple organisations could be onerous. In addition, under the new provisions, there is 
the issue of being certain, ex anteWKDWWKH¼PLOOLRQDQQXDOWKUHVKROGZLOOQRWEHH[FHHGHGZKHQ
decisions on spending do not lie with the party reporting the measure under the GBER.  
2.2.2 Notification under the RAG 
2QHRIWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VNHy objectives under the State aid modernisation initiative was to reduce the 
number of cases which it was required to scrutinise individually and to focus its attention on measures 
most likely to have serious implications for competition. To date, just five schemes have come to be 
scrutinised on the basis of RAG 2014-20. Three of these concern reduction of excise duties in the 
Outermost regions.  
Figure 6: Schemes notified under RAG 2014-20 
Country Scheme Reason for notification 
Norway Social security concession Operating aid falling outside the GBER 
France Reduced rate of excise duty on traditional rum 
produced in DOM 
Outermost region operating aid falling outside 
the GBER 
Portugal Reduced rate of excise duty applied to liqueurs and 
eaux-de-vie in the Azores  
Outermost region operating aid falling outside 
the GBER 
Portugal Reduced rate of excise duty applied to rum and 
liqueurs in Madeira 
Outermost region operating aid falling outside 
the GBER 
Germany Subordinated loans for SMEs in Saxony Non-transparent aid ± methodology for aid 
element calculation approved by COM 
Source: DG COMP database: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?clear=1&policy_area_id=3  
and EFTA Surveillance Authority State aid register: http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/  
The German (Sachsen) case essentially concerns the approval by the Commission of a proposed 
methodology for assessing the aid element in a loan scheme. The precise nature and terms of the 
loan meant that the gross grant equivalent could not readily be calculated simply on the basis of the 
reference UDWHVDQGWKHVFKHPHZDVQRWµWUDQVSDUHQW¶ZLWKLQWKHPHDQLQJRIWKH*%(5 
The most significant decision taken to date on the basis of RAG 2014-20 is the EFTA Surveillance 
Authority decision in June 201410 to approve the regionally-differentiated social security contributions 
in Norway for 2014-20. The decision is based on the ESA Guidelines on Regional Aid,11 which are 
analogous to RAG 2014-20 for the sectors covered by the EEA agreement.12  
The Norwegian social security concession is distinctive in several respects. First, it constitutes 
regional operating aid, which is rarely approved under the regional aid rules and then only in closely-
defined circumstances. Second, assisted areas for operating aid are different from those for 
investment aid ± they are not based on the population ceilings or designation criteria set out in the 
RAG, but rather subject to a separate assessment by the Commission, or, in this case, ESA. Third, 
the scheme is extremely large ± annual spend is around NOK 13 billion ± VRPH¼Eillion, of which 
around half is accounted for by undertakings engaged in economic activities. In other words, about 
¼PLOOLRQLQYROYHV6WDWHDLGZLWKWKHUHPDLQGHUDFFRXQWHGIRUE\IRUH[DPSOHSXEOLFVHFWRUERGLHV
not engaged in economic activities, and therefore not State aid recipients.  
                                                   
10
 EFTA Surveillance authority Decision of 18 June 2014 on regionally-differentiated social security contributions 
2014-20 (Norway), Dec no: 225/14/COL: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/decisions/225-14-COL.pdf  
11
 http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-III.pdf  
12
 The EEA Agreement does not cover the common agriculture and fisheries policies.  
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There was considerable controversy over the approval of the scheme. Perhaps surprisingly, given 
recent population trends in Norway, the controversy did not concern the assisted area coverage of the 
scheme. The Norwegian authorities proposed an increase in coverage compared to 2007-13, with the 
population rising from 17.7 percent13 to 21.1 percent of the population, but the assisted area map 
proposals proved uncontentious.  
By contrast, the sectoral focus of the scheme was the subject of intense negotiations. The previous 
scheme (2007-2013) had been available to all sectors of activity, with the exception of steel and 
shipbuilding.14 The new scheme was made subject to the sectoral restrictions introduced under RAG 
2014-20, most notably the exclusion of the transport and energy sectors, but also the financial and 
LQVXUDQFH VHFWRUV 7KHVH KDG KLWKHUWR EHHQ HOLJLEOH RQ WKH EDVLV RI WKH µKRUL]RQWDO¶ QDWXUH RI WKH
scheme. The Norwegian authorities argued vigorously for the horizontal approach to be maintained 
and for precise definitions of the sectors subject to limitations under the RAG and GBER.15 This 
approach was rejected by ESA, in league with the Commission, but ESA did specify more closely 
which sectors would be ineligible.16 These are: 
x Steel17 
x Synthetic fibres18 
x Transport ± namely, the transport of passengers by aircraft, maritime transport, road or rail 
and by inland waterway or freight transport services for hire or reward, ie.19 
o NACE 49: land transport and transport via pipelines, excluding: NACE 49.32 taxi 
operation; NACE 49.42 removal services; and NACE 49.5 transport via pipeline 
o NACE 50: water transport 
o NACE 51: air transport, excluding NACE 51.22 space transport.  
x Airports20 
x Energy ± here the ESA decision refers to the GBER, noting the definition of the energy sector 
DV ³HQHUJ\ JHQHUDWLRQ WUDQVPLVVLRQ DQG LQIUDVWUXFWXUH´ 2Q WKLV EDVLV LW FRQFOXGHV WKDW WKH
entire NACE division 35 should be excluded.21 
x Financial and insurance activities (NACE Section K).22 
                                                   
13
 Though the population living in the assisted area had declined to around 16.6 percent.  
14
 EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION of 19 July 2006 on the notified scheme concerning regionally 
differentiated social security contributions (Norway), Decision No: 228/06/COL, http://www.eftasurv.int/media/esa-
docs/physical/10178/data.pdf  
15
 Letter from the Ministers for Local Government and Modernisation and Finance, 28 April 2014: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/KMD/REGA/letter_almunia_29_4_2014.pdf  
16
 Somewhat curiously, perhaps, the shipbuilding sector, which was previously excluded, now appears to be 
eligible. 
17
 RAG 2014-20, Annex IV; ESA RAG 2014-20, Annex II 
18
 RAG 2014-20, Annex IV; ESA RAG 2014-20, Annex II(a) 
19
 This corresponds to the definition in GBER 2014-20, Article 2(45).  
20
 RAG 2014-20, para 11. 
21
 Section 35 includes the activity of providing electric power, natural gas, steam, hot water and the like through a 
permanent infrastructure (network) of lines, mains and pipes. The dimension of the network is not decisive; also 
included are the distribution of electricity, gas, steam, hot water and the like in industrial parks or residential 
buildings. This section therefore includes the operation of electric and gas utilities, which generate, control and 
distribute electric power or gas. Also included is the provision of steam and air-conditioning supply. However, 
Section 35 excludes the production of crude petroleum, the mining and extraction of oil from oil shale and oil 
sands and the production of natural gas and recovery of hydrocarbon liquids (Division 06). Section 35 also 
excludes the (typically long-distance) transport of gas through pipelines, see: Statistical Classification of 
economic activities in the European Community, NACE Rev. 2, see: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-RA-07-015/EN/KS-RA-07-015-EN.PDF  
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x Undertakings performing intra-group activities and whose principal activity falls under NACE 
classes 70.10.23 
The compatibility assessment itself appears rather mechanistic, though the substance of the 
underlying discussions is not always easy to discern. In the context of proportionality, for example, the 
decision appears simply to accept the rates proposed by the Norwegian authorities (which are 
themselves rolled forward from 2007-13) without attempting explicitly to calibrate these with regional 
disparities. 
More noteworthy are the conditions attached to the evaluation of the scheme. This must be delivered 
to ESA by end 2018 and quite stringent criteria are associated with the goals and conduct of the 
evaluation. This is discussed in more detail below. 
A final point to noWH LV WKDW (6$¶V GHFLVLRQ DSSURYLQJ WKH VFKHPH KDV EHHQ FKDOOHQJHG EHIRUH WKH
EFTA Court. The case, brought by Kimek Offshore AS, a company with operations in northern 
Norway, involves an action for annulment of the ESA decision on the grounds that it failed in its 
obligation to open the investigative procedure or to state the reasons on which aspects of its decision 
were made. The substantive part of the decision at issue concerns the availability of the concession to 
undertakings registered outside the aid area hiring workers employed within it. Whilst the applicant 
VRXJKWDQDQQXOPHQWRIWKHGHFLVLRQDVDZKROHLWDOVRDUJXHGIRUWKHµVHYHUDELOLW\¶RIWKHSDUWRIWKH
decision concerning mobile workers. The case was heard in July 2015, but the Court has not yet 
released its findings.24 
2.3 Evaluation requirements and aid approval 
Among the new developments in both RAG 2014-20 and GBER 2014-20 is the scope for the 
Commission to make aid authorisation conditional on its approval of an evaluation plan.  
RAG 2014-20 provides the possibility for the Commission to limit the validity of aid schemes to four 
years in order for an evaluation to be carried out.25 The precise terms of any requirement to undertake 
an evaluation26 are defined in the approval of the aid measure. However, evaluations must by 
undertaken by experts independent from granting authorities, on the basis of a common methodology 
(which the Commission may provide) and must be made public. The circumstances in which an 
evaluation would be imposed as a condition of approval are limited to those with large budgets, 
schemes with novel characteristics or in areas where significant market, technological or regulatory 
changes are envisaged. Evaluations must be carried out in sufficient time for the results to feed in to 
the Commission decision on any extension of the scheme proposed, or at expiry.27  
GBER 2014-20 provides for the expiry of GBER cover after six months for schemes with annual 
EXGJHWV H[FHHGLQJ ¼ PLOOLRQ SHQGLQJ WKH DSSURYDO E\ WKH &RPPLVVLRQ RI DQ appropriate 
evaluation plan. In effect, this means that unless a Member State is able to provide an evaluation plan 
                                                                                                                                                              
22
 RAG 2014-20, para 17. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Case E23/14, see: http://www.eftacourt.int/uploads/tx_nvcases/23_14_RH_EN.pdf  
25
 RAG 2014-20, para 27. 
26
 See also: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/modernisation/evaluation_issues_paper_en.pdf 
27
 RAG 2014-20, para 144. 
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that is acceptable to the Commission, then GBER cover would be withdrawn and the scheme in 
question would need to be notified. As the whole scheme would then be subject to appraisal under 
RAG 2014-20, with the delays inherent in the notification process, there is a strong incentive for 
domestic policymakers to reach early agreement with the Commission on the evaluation plan. 
GBER 2014-20 sets out the minimum requirements for an evaluation plan;28 this should set out: 
x the objectives of the aid scheme 
x evaluation questions 
x result indicators 
x the methodology envisaged 
x data collection requirements 
x proposed timing, including the date of submission of the final report 
x description of the independent body conducting the evaluation or the criteria to be used for 
selecting the evaluator 
x mechanisms for publicising the evaluation. 
A provisional supplementary information sheet for the submission of an evaluation plan is available. 
Its use is not yet mandatory as this requires changes to the Implementing Regulation. However, its 
use is recommended and it refers Member States to a staff working document on a common 
methodology for evaluation.29 A version of this document had been subject to consultation at the end 
of 2013, and many Member States expressed concern at the ambition of the proposal and, more 
fundamentally, at the competence of the Commission to require the evaluations of the effectiveness of 
measures financed with purely domestic resources. Nevertheless, the Commission view seems 
largely to have prevailed. 
By August 2015, evaluation plans had been approved for several regional aid schemes, though not all 
the decisions had been published by the Commission.  
                                                   
28
 GBER 2014-20, Article 2(14). 
29
 Commission Staff Working Document "Common methodology for State aid evaluation, 28 May 2014, 
SWD(2014) 179 final 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/modernisation/state_aid_evaluation_methodology_en.pdf  
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Figure 7: Evaluation plans approved under RAG and GBER 
Country Scheme Basis Annual budget Reference 
Norway Regionally-differentiated 
social security contribution 
(RDSSC)  
RAG ¼404 million (NOK 13 billion) Dec no: 
225/14/COL 
United 
Kingdom 
Regional Growth Fund (RGF) GBER ¼PLOOLRQELOOLRQ± 
rounds 5 and 6, not all of which 
is State aid) 
SA.39273 
Czech 
Republic 
Investment Incentives GBER 437 million SA.38751 
Hungary Development tax benefit 
scheme 
GBER ¼PLOOLRQHUF 82.4 billion) SA.39669 
Germany 
 GBER  C(2015)1349 final 
of 24 February 
2015  
Poland Special Economic Zones 
(SEZ) 
GBER ¼PLOOLRQ3/1ELOOLRQ SA.40523, 
SA.38830 Not yet 
published 
Portugal Inovação Empresarial GBER n/a Not yet published 
Note : A French scheme for the 'pSDUWHPHQWVG¶RXWUHPHU ($LGH ILVFDOHj O¶LQYHVWLVVHPHQWSURGXFWLI) has also 
had an evaluation plan approved on the basis of the regional aid rules, but DOM policies are not considered part 
of regional policy per se in France.  
The approval of the social security concession in Norway by ESA30 provides for quite an exhaustive 
evaluation designed to assess: 
1. The impact of the scheme on job opportunities and employment in the eligible regions, using 
results indicators that measure the impact which lowering employment costs through the 
scheme has on: 
a. Labour market participation rates 
b. Employment growth in the public and private sector 
c. Wage formation and household disposable income 
d. Industrial structure 
e. Educational level of the workforce 
f. Municipal and state finances 
The analysis is to include the effects of the scheme on the labour market by region and sector 
and assess the impact of the scheme on both undertakings and employees, in order to 
determine who benefits. 
 
2. The impact of the scheme on competition and trade, including issues related to size of 
undertaking and international competition. 
A detailed timeline for the evaluation, as well as the participation of ESA in a methodological 
workshop, is also provided for with the delivery of the evaluation to ESA envisaged by end 2018. 
Domestically, the process began with a feasibility study31 which was the subject of a wider 
consultation.32  
                                                   
30
 EFTA Surveillance authority Decision of 18 June 2014 on regionally-differentiated social security contributions 
2014-20 (Norway), Dec no: 225/14/COL: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid/Consolidated_version_-
_Decision_225_14_COL__NOR_Social_Security_contributions_2014-2020.pdf  
31
 Samfunnsøkonomisk Analyse AS (2015) Evaluation of the regionally differentiated social security contribution 
scheme in Norway ± a feasibility study: 
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Elsewhere, the process is somewhat less advanced since evaluation plans were reported on the 
basis of the GBER rather than the RAG (which was adopted earlier). In other words, the evaluation 
requirement was triggered by the budget of the scheme rather than through the notification process. 
Although the approval decisions have not all yet been published (e.g. the decisions for Germany, 
Poland and Portugal), it seems that decisions on the evaluation plans are taking in the order of four to 
six months. In Germany, in particular, the length of these negotiations was a source of irritation. 
It also seems that the CoPPLVVLRQ¶V ZRUNLQJ SDSHU33 has been influential in determining the scope 
and nature of the plans approved ± see Figure 7, which shows the prominence of econometric 
techniques, especially difference in differences, in the evaluation plans. Indeed, some policymakers 
KDYHFULWLFLVHGWKHµRYHU-SUHVFULSWLYHQHVV¶RIWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VDSSURDFKDVZHOODVWKHHPSKDVLVRQ
very short-term effects rather than long-term impacts. In the Polish context, a particular issue is the 
sheer number of evaluations required since much of Polish regional policy is co-financed by Cohesion 
policy, which has its own evaluation regime.  
At this stage it is difficult to assess what the implications of the evaluation requirement will be. One 
concern is the very short-term nature of the effects being measured ± because of the timescale of the 
GBER and RAG requirements (with evaluation results required six months before the end of 2014-20 
period) - and whether there is a risk that changes could be sought to schemes before any information 
about their real longer-term impact is actually known. The German authorities were keen also to 
examine  longer terms impacts and so have agreed to provide, not only an evaluation by the end of 
June 2020, but also a second evaluation using data for the full 2014-20 period, to be published after 
the end of the period. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/de4d96bf32814b9e9e6fb5bc1b8a7b20/rdssc-scheme-feasibility-
study.pdf  
32
 RDSSC consultation ± workshop on methodology: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/kommuner-og-
regioner/regional--og-distriktspolitikk/pameldinger-seminarer-rega/rdssc-evaluation/id2402256/  
33
 Commission Staff Working Document "Common methodology for State aid evaluation, 28 May 2014, 
SWD(2014) 179 final 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/modernisation/state_aid_evaluation_methodology_en.pdf  
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Figure 8: Regional aid evaluation plans approved by the Commission (at August 2015) 
Country Scheme Objectives Evaluation questions Results indicators Methods 
Norway RDSSC To prevent or reduce 
depopulation in already sparsely 
populated areas by lowering 
employment costs for 
companies located in these 
areas, with the expectation that 
this will stimulate the local labour 
markets and lead to increased 
job opportunities and 
employment. 
:KDWLVWKHVFKHPH¶VLPSDFWRQ
job opportunities and employment 
in the eligible regions, and 
prevention or reduction of 
depopulation? 
What is the effect on competition 
and trade? 
Labour market participation; 
employment level and growth by 
zone and industry; wage income 
by zone; disposable income; 
industrial structure; firms size 
distribution; education level; 
central and local government 
incomes; capital accumulation; 
use of intermediates; hourly wage 
costs (Feasibility study proposal) 
Difference in differences modelling 
Regression discontinuity design 
Matching procedure to identify 
control group 
(Feasibility study proposal) 
United 
Kingdom 
Regional 
Growth Fund 
(RGF) 
Stimulate enterprises by 
supporting projects/programmes 
with potential for economic 
growth, leveraging private 
investment and creating 
additional sustainable private 
sector employment 
Support area which are currently 
dependent on the public sector 
to make the transition to 
sustainable private sector led 
growth and prosperity. 
Impact: what are the causal 
effects of RGF-funded projects 
and programmes on beneficiary 
firms? 
Economic evaluation: how far are 
the costs of RGF justified by the 
benefits achieved? 
For firm level grants and loans: 
capital investment, training 
expenditure, number of workers 
trained, research and 
development, patents, 
employment levels, profitability, 
productivity. 
For land and property: 
intermediate effects in local 
property markets (space and 
rents), employment and 
unemployment.  
Longitudinal panel data sets 
comprising applicants, non-
applicants, successful and 
unsuccessful applicants analysed 
through fuzzy regression 
discontinuity design, propensity 
score matching and fixed effects, 
difference in differences for survey 
data and synthetic control 
methods. 
Czech 
Republic 
Investment 
Incentives 
Eliminate difference between 
developed and less-developed 
regions 
Reduce difference in 
unemployment rates through the 
creation of new jobs 
Promote creation of higher 
skilled jobs 
Promote economic development 
by supporting investment 
projects focused on advanced 
technologies and activities with 
high added value and export 
potential 
Increase international 
How did assisted companies 
develop compared with a control 
group? 
Did amendments implemented on 
the basis of mid-term evaluation 
contribute to achievement of 
objective? 
What are the lessons for future aid 
schemes? 
Projects assisted; amounts of aid; 
amount of investment aided; 
leverage effects; net jos created; 
increase in value-added; increase 
in labour productivity; increase in 
sales; total amount of investment; 
Control group (non-assisted firms) 
and aided firms analysed using 
difference in differences. 
Qualitative data collected in 
interviews with beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiaries. 
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competitiveness in innovation, IT 
and strategic services 
Hungary Development 
tax benefit 
scheme 
Encourage sustainable new 
investment and job creation 
Alleviate regional disparities 
through regionally-differentiated 
support 
Does the scheme generate 
additional improvement in the 
level of investment, employment, 
gross value-added and labour 
productivity? 
Does the scheme incur a 
deadweight loss? 
Is the scheme most cost-effective 
than other support schemes? 
What is the additional fiscal 
dividend of the scheme in the long 
term? 
Annual investment flows; 
capitalised costs of assets; 
change in non-financial assets; 
wages and salaries; employment 
headcount; GVA/average 
headcount; GVA/wages.  
&RQWUROJURXSRIµPDWFKHG¶QRQ-
assisted firms for some eligible 
groups; case studies for niche 
sectors and projects with positive 
spillovers and externalities (R&D, 
environment). 
Difference in differences to 
measure direct impact, 
deadweight loss, proportionality 
and appropriateness. 
Germany GRW To offset the locational 
disadvantages of the structurally 
weaker regions by supporting 
economic development to 
reduce regional disparities 
Has GRW funding had an 
incentive effective on assisted 
firms? 
Does income and employment 
differ between comparable aided 
and non-aided firms? 
Are aided firms more viable in the 
long term? 
Is there evidence of other effect? 
Eg employee skills, R&D 
intensity? 
What is the causal impact of the 
GRW on aided firms? 
What is the cost of the 
programme? 
Employment 
Revenue 
Survival rates 
Skills  
&RQWUROJURXSRIµPDWFKHG¶QRQ-
assisted firms. 
Difference in differences 
Poland Special 
Economic 
Zones (SEZ) 
    
Portugal Inovacao 
Empresarial 
    
Source: DG COMP and ESA decisions, EPRC country research; the decisions for Poland and Portugal are not yet published.
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2.4 State aid, regional policy and definitional issues 
$FULWLFDO LVVXH LQPDWWHUVRI6WDWHDLGFRPSOLDQFH LV WKDWDFRQFUHWHGHILQLWLRQ UHPDLQVHOXVLYH ³WKH
European Court has not yet provided a consistent and comprehensive interpretation of the conditions 
IRU 6WDWH DLG´34 Moreover, the result of Commission practice has been a tendency to blur the 
distinction between the presence of aid and its compatibility with the Treaty. This is evident in several 
provisions of the new GBER which in some cases brings within the ambit of compatibility measures 
that had not hitherto been considered as aid at all by domestic policymakers. At the same time, the 
Commission has tended to encourage use of the de minimis Regulation or of the GBER as 
mechanisms to deal with doubts about whether aid is present. While this may in some respects be 
regarded as expedient, it should also be recalled that both the GBER and the de minimis Regulation 
have quite onerous administrative requirements associated with them.  
In 2014 the Commission sought, for the first time, systematically to clarify the concept of State aid. 
This took the form of a draft notice35 which was subject to consultation; this closed on 31 March 2014. 
For the most part the document is a compilation of existing case law ± since the ultimate arbiter is the 
European Court - EXW LW DOVR UHIHUV WR WKH µGHFLVLRQDO SUDFWLFH¶ RI WKH &RPPLVVLRQ ,W UHPDLQV WR EH
seen whether the document is actually finalised ± there are questions over the status of the document 
and while some Member States responded positively to the consultation and attempts at clarification, 
this was not universal. Nevertheless, there are signs that the Commission is seeking to clarify the 
scope of aid, not least in order to reduce its own workload and focus on priority cases. 
2.4.1 6RPHµQRDLG¶GHFLVLRQV 
In recent months the Commission has reached decisions in a number of cases where it found no aid 
to be present ± perhaps indicating that, following several years of decisional practice in which the 
tendency has been to widen the definition of aid, the time has come to rein it back in.  
In Propapier,36 the Commission had been obliged to open an investigative procedure following the 
*HQHUDO &RXUW¶V DQQXOPHQW RI LWV HDUOLHU GHFLVLRQ WR DOORZ DLG ZKLFK KDV EHHQ FKDOOHQJHG E\ D
competitor Smurfit Kappa.37 The complainant had alleged that certain infrastructure projects financed 
by State resources in an industrial park were exclusively intended for Propapier and should therefore 
be deemed State aid. These concerned: 
x the construction of a parking facilities for trucks and cars 
x a new connecting road 
x widening and deepening of the Oder-Spree Canal  
x the construction of a waste-water treatment plant. 
                                                   
34
 Bacon, K (2013) European Union Law of State Aid, Second edition, Oxford University Press, p20. 
35
 European Commission (2014) Draft Commission Notice on the notion of State aid pursuant to Article 
107(1)TFEU, see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2014_state_aid_notion/index_en.html  
36
 Commission Decision 2015/508 of 1 October 2014 on alleged infrastructure aid implemented by Germany in 
favour of Propapier PM2 GmbH, OJEU L89/72 of 1 April 2015. 
37
 Case T-304/08 Smurfit Kappa Group plc v Commission. 
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The focus of the Commission analysis was on whether the infrastructures were dedicated to 
Propapier: 
³7KH &RPPLssion has considered in the past that public authorities can carry out work to 
develop their land. They can, for instance, finance investments into infrastructure which will 
benefit the population as a whole. Moreover, the Commission considers that the reason for 
setting up such infrastructure is irrelevant, provided it is in the interests of the local community 
as a whole. However, if such infrastructure will serve the needs of a private company only, 
that company is responsible for funding it. This follows from the fact that, where State aid is 
FRQFHUQHG WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V UHPLW LV WRDQDO\VH WKH LPSDFWRI WKHPHDVXUHVFRQFHUQHG LQ
practice, rather than the objectives pursued. In the present case, the Commission therefore 
takes the view that it is a matter of analysing which infrastructure is of benefit to the 
community as a whole (including Propapier) and which is of use only to Propapier. It is only 
WKHODWWHUZKLFKVKRXOGEHILQDQFHGE\3URSDSLHU´ 
The Commission then observed that the issue of aid to owners and operators of the road, car park 
and canal did not arise because their use was free of charge; they were not, therefore, operated by 
undertakings. Thereafter, the Commission considered each element in turn. Regarding the parking 
facilities, the Commission considered that the German authorities had provided sufficient evidence 
that this was a planned development of the industrial area by the public authorities; it also noted that it 
was open to other users and that, as Propapier had its own parking facilities, it was not dependent on 
those that were publicly funded. The absence of rest facilities was not relevant to whether it 
constituted general infrastructure. Accordingly the Commission concluded that the parking facilities 
did not involve State aid to Propapier. A similar reasoning applied to the construction of the 
connecting road ± the German authorities showed that it was part of a wider planned development 
and was accessible to any user. Regarding the canal, this had been extended with a view to attracting 
firms to the area, but the Commission concluded that there was no causal link between these works 
and the settlement of Propapier or that these works would offer a selective advantage to Propapier. 
Regarding the waste treatment plant, this did constitute an economic activity on the part of the 
operator (which had itself received aid), and the complainant had alleged indirect aid since the plant 
had benefited from an investment grant. However, although Propapier currently used up to 70 percent 
of the capacity of the plant, it was not considered to be dedicated to Propapier partly because the 
modular approach to its construction had been designed to benefit other users as demand rose. As 
with the other infrastructure elements, the key issues were the presence of an overall plan and the 
access by other users. 
In TenderNed38 the Commission had occasion to consider the issue of economic activities. In order to 
qualify as aid, the recipient of the advantage conferred must be an undertaking. The notion of 
undertaking is neutral as to ownership, legal status and financing. The term undertaking is not defined 
in EU law, but it is established that it may be public or private, voluntary, charitable or not-for-profit, 
involve a group of organisations or a public-private partnership or a self-employed individual; the key 
is not the status of the organisation, but rather that it must be engaged in an economic activity in order 
for Article 107(1) to apply. Economic activity LVEURDGO\GHILQHGDV µDQ\DFWLYLW\FRQVLVWing in offering 
JRRGV RU VHUYLFHV RQ D JLYHQ PDUNHW¶39 7KHUH LV QR GHILQLWLYH OLVW RI HFRQRPLF DFWLYLWLHV EXW µQRQ-
                                                   
38
 Alleged State aid to The Netherlands e-procurement platform, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/255396/255396_1614207_95_2.pdf  
39
 C-222/04 0LQLVWHURGHOO¶(FRQRPLDHGHOOH)LQDQ]HYCassa di Risparmio di Firenze [2006] ECR I-289, para 
108.  
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HFRQRPLF¶DFWLYLWLHVLQFOXGHWKRVHUHODWHGWR6WDWHSUHURJDWLYHVDQGSXEOLFVDIHW\VXFKDVSDVVSRUWV
police, armed forces, air and maritime traffic control, as well as the organisation of public education 
and compulsory social security contributions.  
Following the adoption of a new package of public procurement rules, the Dutch authorities 
established an e-procurement platform, TenderNed, within the Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
TenderNed is aimed at supporting the public procurement process from the publication of the notice 
to the award of the contract. The functional requirements deriving from the 2014 Procurement 
Directives were taken into account in the design and construction of the system. TenderNed consists 
of a number of elements, made available to potential tenderers at no cost: (i) a publication module, 
which can be used for the publication of tender notices as well as associated tender documents, at no 
cost; (ii) a tendering (submission) module, offering functionalities such as the exchange of questions 
and answers, the uploading and downloading of tenders and bids  - this module also includes a virtual 
company file in which enterprises can introduce and manage their data; and (iii) an e-guide, which 
supports contracting authorities in using TenderNed. 
The complainants (firms engaged in the provision of online information on public tenders) alleged that 
the financing of TenderNed involved unlawful and incompatible State aid. However, in considering the 
case, the Commission concluded that TenderNed's publication module ensures that contracting 
authorities and special sector entities comply with the transparency obligation under the Union and 
Dutch public procurement rules and TenderNed's tendering module ensures that public procurement 
contracts are appropriately tendered under those rules, while the e-guide fulfils the obligations of The 
Netherlands under the Union Procurement Directives to offer information and support to contracting 
authorities and economic operators and the supply of statistical information to the Commission is also 
laid down by those Directives. As such, the Commission took the view that TenderNed's activities had 
their origin entirely in supporting the procurement activities of the Dutch public authorities and the 
obligations of the Dutch State under the Procurement Directives and were not economic in nature. As 
a result, there could be no State aid present.  
2.4.2 No aid decisions ± no effect on trade 
A series of decisions announced in April provided some guidance on the issue of impact on trade.40 
Measures that do not have an impact on trade do not constitute State, but only on rare occasions 
have the Court or the Commission concluded that there is no such effect. In these decisions, the 
Commission provides some indications on the circumstances in which activities can be judged to 
have a purely local impact and no, or at most marginal, foreseeable effects on trade. In Hradec 
Králové public hospitals the Commission considered that the main activity of the hospitals is to 
provide medical care in the local catchment area, and there is no indication of relevant cross-border 
investments in hospitals or the establishment of healthcare providers from other Member States in the 
region. Similar issues arose in Medical centre in Durmersheim where the Commission further 
considered that the alleged beneficiary was not engaged in any activity for which competition is taking 
place at a wider than local level. Landgrafen-Klinik receives compensation for the losses incurred in 
the provision of healthcare services, but the Commission noted that of over 3000 patients treated in 
2013, not one came from another Member State, reflecting the purely local nature of its activities and 
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 European Commission press release, State aid: Commission gives guidance on local public support measures 
that can be granted without prior Commission approval, 29 April 2015: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
15-4889_en.htm  
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the absence of any likely effect on trade. Similarly, investment aid for the lengthening of a fishing quay 
in Lauwersoog port was not deemed to increase the capacity of the port to cater for larger ships and 
would be used only by small vessels owing to its proximity to the relevant fishing grounds; it would not 
attract fishermen from other Member States. Free advisory and consultancy services provided to 
SMEs and start-ups in a disadvantaged part of Kiel by Projektgesellschaft Kiel-Gaarden GmbH 
were not considered to affect trade since there was no evidence of cross-border investments in 
services providing very basic advice in socially-disadvantaged areas. In Glenmore Lodge subsidies 
provided by SportScotland were found not to involve State aid since the market catered to was largely 
regional, at most national and there was no evidence of cross-border investment in this type of 
activity. Last, tax breaks applicable to Member-owned golf clubs were found not to affect trade ± the 
tax breaks are capped at low levels which exclude clubs that generate significant revenues from non-
member players (from the UK and abroad) which could compete with golf courses outside the UK.  
These decisions are line with the principle enunciated in the State aid modernisation initiative that the 
Commission should further focus its scrutiny on measures most likely to cause serious harm to 
competition and aim to both provide comfort to domestic policymakers and reduce the workload of the 
Commission insofar as it relates to case which do not raise competition concerns. 
2.4.3 Tax and State aid ± horizontal enquiries and formal investigations 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the Commission has begun a high profile series of actions in the 
field of taxation. On the one hand, it has launched an enquiry into tax rulings in all Member States,41 
having initially restricted this to a few. On the other hand, it has opened investigations into alleged aid 
to Starbucks (Netherlands), Amazon and Fiat Finance (Luxembourg) and Apple (Ireland). All four 
cases concern tax rulings dealing with transfer pricing arrangements between companies of the same 
group. The Commission has already reached a preliminary view that State aid is likely to be present. 
If confirmed by the in-depth investigation, the beneficiaries would have to repay the aid concerned 
with interest, subject to a limitation period of 10 years ± though calculating the value of the aid 
received would likely prove contentious since it would not take the form of a direct transfer of State 
resources as in the case of a grant.  
The Commission has long shied away from direct scrutiny of such tax arrangements, partly reflecting 
the complex interface between State aid and taxation, not least associated with issues of sovereignty 
in tax affairs, but also the considerable difficulty in obtaining information on tax arrangements for 
multinational enterprises. These investigations, together with the general enquiry, signal the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VGHWHUPLQDWLRQWRDGGUHVVWD[SUDFWLFHs that have long eluded regulation. 
2.4.4 Infrastructure and State aid ± a work in progress 
An important issue that remains unresolved to date concerns State aid to infrastructure. In the wake 
of the so-called Leipzig-Halle case the relationship between funding of infrastructure and the State 
aid rules changed.42 Historically, public funding of general infrastructure was either considered to be 
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 European Commission press release: State aid: Commission extends information enquiry on tax rulings 
practice to all Member States, Brussels, 17 December 2014:  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-
2742_en.htm  
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 C-288/11 P, Freistaat Sachsen and others v European Commission (Leipzig Halle) 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&text=&pageIndex=0&part=1&mode=lst&do
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ZLWKLQ WKH µSXEOLF UHPLW¶ RU LI QRQ-discriminatory access was granted to all potential users, was not 
considered to involve State aid.43 7KH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VUHDSSUDLVDORIWKHSRVLWLRQIROORZLQJLeipzig-Halle 
extended the reach of the State aid rules into different areas of infrastructure support and created 
significant uncertainty. In particular, a precise definition of what transactions qualify as State aid 
remains elusive, while the development of rules on what types of infrastructure aid are compatible 
with the Treaty is far from complete.  
The European Court of Justice ruling in Leipzig-Halle44 links the construction of infrastructure to its 
later exploitation: if the subsequent use of the infrastructure constitutes an economic activity, then the 
funding of the construction may entail State aid. Importantly, the Commission has made clear its view 
that:45 
³LW FDQQRW EH GHQLHG DQymore that the financing of any type of infrastructure (excluding 
infrastructure related to security, safety, etc.) that is later commercially exploited is State aid 
UHOHYDQW´>HPSKDVLVLQRULJLQDO@ 
This means that only infrastructure that is not commercially exploited and is built in the interest of the 
general public is excluded from the application of the State aid rules. Examples include public roads 
(other than toll roads / roads operated by a concessionaire) or public parks and playgrounds. In 
addition, case law has confirmed that infrastructure related to national security, safety, air traffic 
control, meteorological services all fall within the public remit. Notwithstanding these exclusions, it is 
evident that there are few types of infrastructure funding that fall clearly outside the scope of the State 
aid rules, though the precise contours of the public remit have yet to emerge. 
Following the shift in its thinking in the aftermath of Leipzig-Halle, the Commission provided some 
initial guidance to 0HPEHU 6WDWHV LQ WKH IRUP RI µDQDO\WLFDO JULGV¶46 These outline the key issues 
associated with: (i) determining the presence of State aid; and (ii) identifying the circumstances in 
ZKLFK DLG FDQ EH IRXQG WR EH FRPSDWLEOH $ µJHQHUDO¶ DQDO\WLFDO JULG LV FRPplemented by sector 
specific grids concerning the following: airport infrastructures; broadband infrastructures; culture ± 
such as the construction of multipurpose arenas, museums, film studios, cinemas and renovation of 
historical monuments; port infrastructure; research development and innovation; and water services.  
For practical purposes, however, the guidance provided by the grids is rather limited and they anyway 
have no legal status ± WKH\ H[SOLFLWO\ ³GR QRW SUHMXGJH SRVVLEOH GHYHORSPHQWV LQ WKH HQIorcement 
SUDFWLFH´$W WKHVDPH WLPH LQVRPHRI WKHDUHDVQRWHGVSHFLILFJXLGHOLQHVDOUHDG\DSSO\EXWKDYH
been subject to review (broadband, airports, for example). In addition, some aspects of support for 
infrastructure are implicated in horizontal measures including the RAG and the GBER, which extends 
the exemption to sports infrastructure, multipurpose venues and local infrastructures. Notwithstanding 
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 DG Competition (2011) Note to DG Regio (unpublished), see: http://www.esfondi.lv/upload/00-
vadlinijas/Note_on_State_aid_for_infrastructure_projects.pdf (accessed March 2014). 
44
 C-288/11 P, Freistaat Sachsen and others v European Commission (Leipzig Halle) 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&text=&pageIndex=0&part=1&mode=lst&do
cid=131967&occ=first&dir=&cid=17784 (accessed March 2014).  
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 DG Competition (2011) op cit. 
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 Letter to Member States 1 August 2012: http://www.kr-kralovehradecky.cz/assets/kraj-volene-
organy/obce/metodicka-pomoc-obcim/LetterRespectofStateaidrules_cdfd5ace396c4aeeba58e96f7a1c14a1.pdf 
(accessed March 2014) to which the analytical grids are appended, see: http://www.esfondi.lv/upload/00-
vadlinijas/EK_ieteikumi_valsts_atbalsta_noteiksanai_(infrastructure_Analytical_Grid).pdf (accessed March 2014). 
Note that these documents appear not to be available centrally from the Commission (eg. on the DG COMP 
website), but have been uploaded onto the web by some managing authorities.  
Recent developments in Competition policy and regional aid 
European Policies Research Paper No. 92 22 European Policies Research Centre 
these various developments, some significant uncertainties remain. In particular, for a number of 
areas, it is unclear in what precise circumstances the funding of infrastructure has State aid 
implications: 47 
³t)he classification as an activity falling within the exercise of public powers or as an 
economic activity must be carried out separately for each activity engaged in by a given 
entity´ 
In addition, where a measure does involve State aid there is no overarching framework under which 
to determine the compatibility or otherwise of that aid; the coverage of existing sector or activity-
specific frameworks is only partial. Importantly, this matters not just for the future, but also for the past 
since the Commission will have to apply the Leipzig-Halle reasoning in investigating potentially 
unlawful aid. 
In recent months, the Commission has reached decisions on a number of infrastructure cases, but the 
absence of a specific framework means that assessment has to be made directly against the Treaty 
provisions and case-by-case justification is required. This includes identifying who are the 
beneficiaries of the project at various levels (owner, operator and user). These are complex analyses 
with the amount of aid calculated on a case by case basis, based on the funding gap. A further 
complication for some countries is that there is no coherence between the methodology for the 
quantification of the aid and the funding gap in the Cohesion policy Common Provisions Regulation. 
Each major project requires filling in a fiche that has to be approved by DG Regio, but DG Regio 
calculates the amount of aid in a different way from DG Competition, with the possibility that Cohesion 
policy funding is lost due to uncertainties over the definition of the public remit, which is not always 
well-defined in DG Competition decisions.  
A working group on designing infrastructure projects that do not raise issues under State Aid Law is 
being established by DG Competition and there has been mention of a framework or guidelines once 
the Commission has amassed sufficient experience. In the meantime, a piecemeal approach involving 
considerable uncertainties persists. 
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 Joined cases T-455/08 Flughafen Leipzig Halle GmbH and Mitteldeutsche Flughafen AG v Commission and T-
443/08 Freistaat Sachsen and Land Sachsen v Commission: 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=81849&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&di
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3. REGIONAL AID TO LARGE FIRMS IN THE NEW LEGAL ORDER 
7KH WUHDWPHQW RI LQYHVWPHQW DLG WR ODUJH ILUPV LQ µF¶ DUHDV KDV EHHQ D PDMRU LVVXH VLQFH '*
&RPSHWLWLRQILUVWIORDWHGSURSRVDOVIRU5$*UHIRUPLQLWVµQRQ-SDSHU¶48 These proposals involved 
DFRPSOHWHEDQRQDLGWRODUJHILUPVLQWKHµF¶DUHDV7KLVZDVDUJXDEO\WKHPRVWFRQWHQWLRXVDVSHFWRI
the reform proposals and two joint letters to Commissioner Almunia attracted support from the 
majority of countries with a least sRPH µF¶DUHDFRYHUDJH ,QDGGLWLRQ WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V LQLWLDO5$*
proposals were the subject of intensive bilateral lobbying from a number of quarters. RAG 2014-20 
and GBER 2014-20 ultimately pulled back from the complete ban on investment aid to large firms in 
µF¶ DUHDV EXW QRQHWKHOHVV LPSRVH VRPH YHU\ VLJQLILFDQW FRQVWUDLQWV RQ DLGLQJ VXFK LQYHVWPHQW
UHIOHFWLQJWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VFRQFHUQWRIRFXVDLGRQFDVHVZKHUHLWLVSHUFHLYHGWRKDYHDQ µincentive 
effect¶.  
The tortuous negotiation process of the RAG and the GBER led to a complicated compromise over 
WKHHOLJLELOLW\RIODUJHILUPVIRUUHJLRQDOLQYHVWPHQWDLGLQµF¶DUHDVUnder RAG 2014-20, regional aid 
IRU ODUJH XQGHUWDNLQJV LQ µF¶ DUHDV PD\ RQO\ EH JUDQWHG IRU ¶LQLWLDO LQYHVWPHQWV WKDW FUHDWH QHZ
econRPLF DFWLYLWLHV¶ RU µIRU WKH GLYHUVLILFDWLRQ RI H[LVWLQJ HVWDEOLVKPHQWV LQWR QHZ SURGXFWV RU QHZ
SURFHVV LQQRYDWLRQV¶49 This is wider than the scope of the GBER, which does not allow for the 
possibility of regional aid to large firms for new process innovations LQ µF¶ DUHDV However, new 
process innovations are not defined in RAG 2014-20 and the scope of this provision would only 
become apparent with some decisional practice on the part of the Commission. Nevertheless, while 
some definitional elements remain unclear, it is evident that investment aid simply to expand existing 
SURGXFWLRQIDFLOLWLHVLVQRORQJHUDYDLODEOHWRODUJHILUPVLQµF¶DUHDV  
In July 2015 the Commission published an initial response50 to so-FDOOHGµIUHTXHQWO\DVNHGTXHVWLRQV¶
on the GB(5 VXEPLWWHG E\ GRPHVWLF DXWKRULWLHV 7KHVH µ)$4V¶ DUH QRW VROHO\ FRQFHUQHG ZLWK WKH
issue of large firms, but a good deal of the document is concerned with related definitional issues. 
3.1 7KH*%(5µVHWWOHVLQ¶± Commission responses to FAQs 
3.1.1  µ,QLWLDO LQYHVWPHQW¶ DQG µLQLWLDO LQYHVWPHQW LQ IDYRXU RI QHZ HFRQRPLF
DFWLYLWLHV¶ 
GBER 2014-20 GLVWLQJXLVKHVEHWZHHQµLQLWLDOLQYHVWPHQW¶ZKLFKPD\EHDLGHGLQµD¶UHJLRQVIRUILUPVRI
DOOVL]HVDQGIRU60(VLQ µF¶DUHDVDQGµLQLWLDO LQYHVWPHQW in favour of new economic DFWLYLW\¶; aid to 
ODUJHHQWHUSULVHVLQµF¶DUHDVµVKDOORQO\EHJUDQWHGIRUDQLQLWLDOLQYHVWPHQWLQIDYRXURIQHZHFRQRPLF
DFWLYLW\ LQ WKHDUHDFRQFHUQHG¶51 Initial investment and initial investment in favour of new economic 
activity are defined in the GBER52 as shown in Figure 9. 
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 This was not published, but see: :LVKODGH)¶1RQ-Paper: Non-Starter or Non-Negotiable? EU 
Competition Policy and Regional Aid Control Post-¶(XURSHDQ3ROLF\5HVHDUFK3DSHUV1R8QLYHUVLW\RI
Strathclyde: http://www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/eprc/documents/PDF_files/EPRP_83.pdf 
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 RAG 2014-20, para 15.  
50
 General Block Exemption Regulation: Frequently Asked Questions, see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/practical_guide_gber_en.pdf  
51
 GBER 2014-20, Article 14(3).  
52
 GBER 2014-20, Article 2(49) and (51), respectively. 
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Figure 9: Initial investment and initial investment in favour of new economic activity 
,QLWLDOLQYHVWPHQWDOOILUPVLQµD¶UHJLRQVDQG
60(VLQµF¶DUHDV 
Initial investment in favour of new economic 
DFWLYLW\ODUJHILUPVLQµF¶DUHDV 
An investment in tangible and intangible assets 
related to: 
x the setting up of a new establishment, 
x extension of the capacity of an existing 
establishment; 
x diversification of the output of an 
existing establishment into new products 
not previously produced in the 
establishment; 
x fundamental change in the overall 
production process of an existing 
establishment 
An investment in tangible and intangible assets 
related to: 
x the setting-up of a new establishment; 
or 
x diversification of the activity of an 
establishment, under the condition that 
the new activity is not the same or a 
similar activity to the activity previously 
performed in the establishment 
An acquisition of assets belonging to an 
establishment that has closed or would have 
closed had it not been purchased, bought by an 
investor unrelated to the seller, but excluding the 
sole acquisition of the shares of the undertaking 
The acquisition of the assets belonging to an 
establishment that has closed or would have 
closed had it not been purchased, bought by an 
investor unrelated to the seller, under condition 
that the new activity to be performed using the 
acquired assets is not the same or a similar 
activity to the activity performed in the 
establishment prior to the acquisition.  
Source: GBER Article 2(49) and 2(50).  
Several important differences emerge from comparing these provisions of the GBER: 
x H[WHQVLRQSURMHFWVDUHLQHOLJLEOHIRUODUJHILUPVLQµF¶DUHDV 
x projects involving a fundamental change in the overall production process of an existing 
HVWDEOLVKPHQWDUHLQHOLJLEOHIRUODUJHILUPVLQµF¶DUHDVXQGHUWKH*%(5 
x diversification projects are defined differently: for initial investment, diversification relates to 
products, while for initial investment in favour of new economic activity, diversification relates 
to the activity, as defined by the NACE classification.  
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Figure 10: Eligible project types by firm size, region and basis for eligibility 
 60(V µD¶ DQG µF¶ UHJLRQV
lDUJHILUPVLQµD¶UHJLRQ 
/DUJHILUPVLQµF¶DUHDV 
Setting-up new establishment GBER (Art 14.3, Art 2.49.a) GBER (Art 14.3, Art 2.51.a) 
Extension of the capacity of an 
existing establishment 
GBER (Art 14.3, Art 2.49.a) Incompatible 
Diversification into products 
not previously produced 
GBER (Art 14.3, Art 2.49.a) Notify under RAG (para 15, 24) 
Fundamental change in the 
overall production process 
GBER (Art 14.3, Art 2.49.a) Notify under RAG (para 15) 
Acquisition of assets of an 
establishment that has closed 
or would have closed 
GBER (Art 14.3, Art 2.49.b) Incompatible 
Acquisition of assets of an 
establishment that has closed, 
or would have closed, on 
condition of diversification into 
new activities that are not the 
same or similar 
Less stringent conditions apply 
to diversification (Art 2.49.a) 
GBER (Art 14.3, Art 2.51.b) 
Diversification of the activity of 
an establishment into new 
activities that are not the same 
or similar 
Less stringent conditions apply 
to diversification (Art 2.49.a) 
GBER (Art 14.3, Art 2.51.b) 
Diversification of an existing 
establishment into new products 
or new process innovations 
GBER (Art 14.3, Art 2.49.a) RAG (para 15) 
Note: In all cases, the GBER only applies up to the adjusted aid amount, beyond which notification is required. 
3.1.2 New products and new activities 
Regarding activities, µWKHVDPHRUVLPLODUDFWLYLW\¶PHDQVDQDFWLYLW\IDOOLQJXQGHUWKHVDPHFODVVIRXU
digit numerical codes) of the NACE classification of activities.53 Accordingly, the Commission services 
have confirmed WKDWGLYHUVLILFDWLRQRUDFTXLVLWLRQSURMHFWVXQGHUWDNHQE\ODUJHILUPVLQµF¶DUHDVPXVW
involve an activity under a different four digit NACE code from the existing activity. 
µ1HZSURGXFWV¶DUHQRWGHILQHGLQWKH*%(57KH&RPPLVVLRQUHVSRQVHWR)$4VLQGLcates that if the 
an initial investment results in an output that falls under a different four digit NACE code, then this can 
be considered as diversification into a new product; however, a different NACE code is not a 
requirement.54 It cites the example of the four digit NACE code for manufacture of other food products 
and notes that if a firm previously producing soups decided to manufacture honey, then this could be 
considered a diversification into a new product even though the NACE code is the same. 
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 GBER 2014-20, Article 2(50). 
54
 GBER FAQs, point 22.  
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In sum, wKLOHWKH*%(5H[HPSWVIURPQRWLILFDWLRQDLGWRODUJHILUPVLQµF¶DUHDVIRUWKHµGLYHUVLILFDWLRQ
RIWKHDFWLYLW\RIDQHVWDEOLVKPHQW¶55 RAG 2014-H[SOLFLWO\UHTXLUHVWKHQRWLILFDWLRQRIDLGµWRGLYHUVLI\
DQH[LVWLQJHVWDEOLVKPHQWLQDµF¶DUHDLQWR QHZSURGXFWV¶56 Overall, this seems unsatisfactory. It is not 
clear what the rationale is for distinguishing between products and activities for the two categories of 
investment and NACE classification is rather ill-suited to defining changes in activities favouring, as it 
does, traditional activities for which the breakdown is much more fine-grained, over new products and 
services. Figure 11 serves to illustrate this point.  
Figure 11: Examples of four-digit NACE classes 
Four digit NACE code Activity description 
14.11 Manufacture of leather clothes 
14.12 Manufacture of workwear 
14.13 Manufacture of other outerwear 
14.14 Manufacture of underwear 
14.19 Manufacture of other wearing apparel and accessories 
14.20 Manufacture of articles of fur 
14.31 Manufacture of knitted and crocheted hosiery 
14.39 Manufacture of other knitted and crocheted apparel 
21.20 Manufacture of pharmaceutical preparations 
26.20 Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment 
26.40 Manufacture of consumer electronics 
63.11 Data processing, hosting and related activities 
Source: Statistical Classification of economic activities in the European Community, NACE Rev. 2, see: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-RA-07-015/EN/KS-RA-07-015-EN.PDF  
3.1.3 Establishment 
The notion of establishment is not defined in the GBER. This is important since setting-up, extension, 
IXQGDPHQWDOFKDQJHDQGGLYHUVLILFDWLRQDUHDOOGHILQHGLQUHODWLRQWRDQµHVWDEOLVKPHQW¶+RZHYHUWKLV
LVVXHZDVUDLVHGLQWKH)$4VDQGWKH&RPPLVVLRQVHUYLFHVKDYHLQGLFDWHGWKLVUHIHUVWRDµSURGXFWLRQ
XQLW¶ DQG QRW D OHJDO HQWLW\57 no specific functions appear to be required (such as accounting or 
SHUVRQQHO)RUODUJHILUPVLQµF¶DUHDVRQO\µLQLWLDOLQYHVWPHQWLQIDYRXURIQHZHFRQRPLFDFWLYLW\ in the 
DUHDFRQFHUQHG¶ LVHOLJLEOHEXWWKHµDUHD¶ LVQRWGHILQHG7KHGUDIW*%(5KDGVSHFLILHGWKDWWKHµQHZ
HVWDEOLVKPHQW¶KDGWREHLQDGLIIHUHQW1876UHJLRQIURPDQ\H[LVWLQJRSHUDWLRQVRIWKHILUPEXWWKLV
requirement was dropped. On the other hand:  
µDQ\LQLWLDOLQYHVWPHQWVWDUWHGE\WKHVDPHEHQHILFLDU\DWJURXSOHYHOZLWKLQDSHULRGRf three 
years of the date of start of works on another aided investment in the same [NUTS 3 region] 
VKDOOEHFRQVLGHUHGWREHSDUWRIDVLQJOHLQYHVWPHQWSURMHFW¶58 
However, this provision appears to relate specifically to the artificial splitting of aided projects in order 
to avoid the capping of the aid amount, rather than to defining the notion of a new economic activity in 
the area concerned. 
                                                   
55
 GBER 2014-20, Article 15(3) as defined by Article 2(51)(a) 
56
 RAG 2014-20, para 24. 
57
 GBER FAQs, point  30.  
58
 GBER, Article 13(14).  
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3.1.4 Relocation59 
Regional aid that is linked to relocation is excluded from the GBER.60 Specifically, this concerns a 
potential beneficiary that has closed down the same or a similar activity in the EEA in the two years 
preceding its application for regional investment aid or which, at the time of the aid application, has 
concrete plans to close down such an activity within a period of up to two years after the initial 
investment for which aid is requested is completed in the area concerned. Several questions appear 
WRKDYHEHHQUDLVHGLQUHODWLRQWRGHILQLQJKRZµFORVXUH¶LQGHWHUPLQHG 
In relation to the beneficiary, thH ZRUNLQJ SDSHU LQGLFDWHV WKDW WKLV VKRXOG EH GHWHUPLQHG DW µJURXS
OHYHO¶GHHPHG WREHDQHFRQRPLFHQWLW\ZLWKDFRPPRQVRXUFHRIFRQWURO UDWKHU WKDQ MXVWDVLQJOH
subsidiary.61 
The closure of the same or similar activity is to be considered at the level of the given establishment 
rather than the region or the Member State. So, the activity would be considered to be closed down if 
the beneficiary closed the activity in a particular establishment even if the group continued the same 
or a similar activity elsewhere in the region or the Member State.62 
The provisions on closure only apply if closure/relocation involves different EEA countries. This 
means that a beneficiary which has or plans to close down a similar activity in the same Member 
State is unaffected by this exclusion.63 
Regarding closure of the same or similar activity, the working paper appears to extend the notion of 
FORVLQJ GRZQ EH\RQG  SHUFHQW FORVXUH WR LQFOXGH SDUWLDO FORVXUH RI DFWLYLW\ ³ZKHQ WKLV UHVXOWV LQ
VXEVWDQWLDOMREORVVHV´)RUWKHse purposes the working paper defines this as at least 100 jobs or a job 
reduction of at least 50 percent of the workforce in the establishment on the date of the application 
(compared to the average employment in the establishment in any of the two years preceding the 
date of application). As a result, notification is required in all cases of full closure and if one or both of 
the thresholds is exceeded in the case of partial closures.64 
3.2 Regional aid and large firms: past and future perspectives 
3.2.1 Impact of the changes in practice 
National perspectives on the changes to the eligibility of large firms vary widely. First, and most 
REYLRXVO\VRPHFRXQWULHVDUHZKROO\RUPDLQO\FRQFHUQHGE\ µD¶ UHJLRQV VXFKDV WKH%DOWLFVWDWHV
Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Romania), which are largely unaffected by the changes in relation 
to large firms.65 
                                                   
59
 The prohibition of support for relocation projects is not limited to large firms, but in practice it would be most 
likely to occur in this segment. 
60
 GBER, Article 13(d). 
61
 GBER FAQs, point 64(1). 
62
 GBER FAQs, point 64(2).  
63
 GBER FAQs, point 64(3).  
64
 GBER FAQs, point 64(4).  
65
 Though the capital regions of Poland, Romania, Hungary and the Czech Republic  
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Second, in some countries, large firms have tended not to be targeted by regional aid ± this is true of 
Norway, Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands, for example ± so the changes have a limited impact 
and have not been viewed as controversial.  
Elsewhere, the exclusion of large firms is more problematic, particularly in the context of the crisis 
where levels of investment are relatively low anyway. This is the case, for instance, in Austria, France, 
Spain, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom where large firms have historically been regular 
beneficiaries of regional aid, if not necessarily targeted as such (though this varies widely between 
these countries).  
It is important to note here that concern about the impact in some countries (notably France, 
*HUPDQ\ $XVWULD UHODWHV WR ILUPV WKDW DUH µVPDOO¶ ODUJH HQWHUSULVHV UDWKHU WKDQ PXOWLQDWLRQDO
enterprises. During the negotiation of RAG 2014-20, France, in particular, promoted the idea of a 
more flexible attitude to firm size around the concept of entreprises à taille intermédiaires (ETI) ± 
those with 250-4,999 employees, but these proposals were not supported by the Commission. It is 
worth mentioning in this context that the new guidelines on State aid for risk finance allow for the 
SRVVLELOLW\RIVXSSRUW WR µVPDOOPLG-FDSV¶± essentially firms with fewer than 500 employees66 on the 
basis that such firms may face similar financing difficulties as SMEs.67 So the Commission is open to 
different definitions of firm size for some types of State aid, if not regional aid.  
In some instances the impact of restricting the eligibility of large firms has been exacerbated by 
changes in assisted area status. In Germany and Spain, in particular (but also in Poland and Romania 
LQ WKHFDSLWDOFLW\UHJLRQV IRUH[DPSOHVRPHµF¶DUHDVSUHYLRXVO\KDG µD¶UHJLRQVWDWXV$VDUHVXOW
there is not only a new constraint on the eligibility of large firm projects, but also a significant reduction 
in award values in the event that large firm investment are eligible at all.  
Some policymakers have commented on the difficulty in interpreting the diversification provisions in 
relation to large firms, noting the administrative costs involved in assessing the investment proposals 
and determining which expenditure relates to diversification as opposed to simple expansion 
LQYHVWPHQW+RZHYHURWKHUVQRWDEO\,WDO\KDYHZHOFRPHGWKHVFRSHWRVXSSRUWGLYHUVLILFDWLRQLQµF¶
areas especially in the context of the crisis.  
The possibility of notifying under RAG 2014-20 an aid scheme aimed at supporting the diversification 
of an existing establishment into new products or new process innovations was the subject of some 
discussion among domestic policymakers,68 but indications are that this has been discouraged by the 
&RPPLVVLRQDQGYLHZHGDVEHLQJRXWZLWKWKHµVSLULW¶RIWKH5$*7KLVLQWXUQPHDQVWKDWDQ\DZDUGWR
large enterprises falling outside the GBER will require case-by-case notification. This in itself is likely 
to diminish interest in regional aid among potential large firm applicants, and arguably reduce the 
incentive effect of the scheme.  
The initial view among some policymakers was that the tightening of the rules on support to large 
ILUPVLQµF¶DUHDVZRXld lead to an increase in notifications as policymakers sought to understand what 
PLJKWEHHOLJLEOHLQUHODWLRQWRµthe diversification of existing establishments into new products or new 
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 In addition, these must have either annual turnover of less WKDQ¼PLOOLRQRUDEDODQFHVKHHWWRWDORIOHVV
WKDQ¼PLOOLRQ 
67
 Guidelines on State aid to promote risk finance investment, OJEU C19/4 of 22 January 2014, point 69. 
68
 (R53$SDUWQHUV¶PHHWLQJ 
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SURFHVVLQQRYDWLRQV¶69 However, there appears to be little appetite among firms for the notification of 
aid proposals. This is perhaps scarcely surprising given the scrutiny to which such proposals would 
be subjected, the time potentially involved in reaching a decision and the uncertainty of the outcome ± 
especially in the absence of precedent decisions. Nevertheless, policymakers in several countries 
report lobbying from firms for regional aid, as well as limited understanding in some policy quarters 
over the implications of the changes. 
Although it is too soon to reach clear conclusions on the impact of the rule changes, some countries 
report a likely underspend in the regional aid budget and/or a reorientation of regional aid monies to 
aid policies with more horizontal objectives (notably innovation). 
3.2.2 Patterns of support for large firms 
A key feature of the reform of regional aid control since the late 1990s has been the priority given to 
reducing the amounts of aid to large projects, monitoring the scale of such aid and Commission 
intervention in certain cases ± even where the award proposed is to be offered under an approved 
scheme. The first such mechanism was introduced in the late 1990s in the form of the so-called 1998 
Multisectoral Framework (MSF 1998).70 This provided that aid exceeding specified ceilings had to be 
notified individually and assessed by the Commission against a set of predetermined criteria. In 
practice, MSF 1998 failed to have any real impact on award values, largely owing to the design of the 
assessment criteria. It was replaced by the 2002 Multisectoral Framework (MSF 2002).71 The terms of 
MSF 2002 were largely incorporated into RAG 2007-13,72 albeit with some changes. 
Under MSF 2002 and RAG 2007-13, there were two main strands to Commission action. First, the 
systematic lowering of aid maxima for all SURMHFWVLQYROYLQJHOLJLEOHLQYHVWPHQWVH[FHHGLQJ¼PLOOLRQ
and the reporting of all aid to such projects (whatever the amount of aid); and second, the prior 
notification and approval of very large awards and their assessment against the terms of RAG 2007-
13 by the Commission. As in RAG 2014-20, where the amount of aid proposed was higher than that 
ZKLFKD¼PLOOLRQLQYHVWPHQWZRXOGUHFHLYHWKHQLQGLYLGXDOQRWLILFDWLRQZDVUHTXLUHG 
In the case of individually notified aid proposals, RAG 2007-13 provided for market share and 
production capacity µscreens¶73 beyond which aid was subject to a formal investigation. These screens 
concerned beneficiaries that had, or would have had, more than 25 percent market share of the 
product concerned or projects which resulted in an increase in capacity of more than 5 percent 
(except in rapidly expanding markets).74 These screens are abolished in RAG 2014-20, reflecting the 
implications of the Smurfit Kappa judgment,75 but there were anyway doubts about their effectiveness 
                                                   
69
 RAG 2014-20, para 15.  
70
 Multisectoral framework on regional aid for large investment projects, OJEC No C 107 of 7 April 1998. 
71
 Multisectoral Framework on regional aid to large investment projects ± Rescue and restructuring aid and 
closure aid for the steel sector, OJEC No C 70/8 of 19 March 2002. 
72
 RAG 2007-13, Section 4.3. 
73
 RAG 2007-13, para 68. 
74
 In practice, most of these investigations were opened because the Commission had doubts about whether the 
screens were exceeded.  
75
 In this case, the Court found that the Commission is not precluded from opening the formal procedure if the 
market share or capacity criteria are not exceeded and that, by inferring that the aid complied with the guidelines 
because the market screens were not exceeded without assessing the importance of the project for regional 
development, the Commission had both misconstrued the scope of the guidelines and failed to exercise its 
discretion ± see Case T-304/08 Smurfit Kappa v Commission (judgment of 10 July 2012). 
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and utility.76 Under RAG 2014-20, all notified aids are subject to the compatibility assessment set out 
in RAG 2014-20: there is no per se presumption of compatibility of the basis of market analysis and 
there is no explicit trigger for the opening of a formal investigation. Although this affects relatively few 
cases, the scale of the aid concerned in those cases is significant and it reflects an important 
underlying shift in philosophy. Looking forward, it remains to be seen what impact this will have on the 
likelihood of notification by domestic authorities and on the workload of DG Competition, particularly in 
WKHFRQWH[WRIWKHQDUURZHU*%(5FULWHULDIRUDLGWRODUJHILUPVLQµF¶DUHDV,QGLFDWLRQVIURPWKHµSRVW-
Smurfit-.DSSD¶ era of RAG 2007-13 suggest that the prospect of an in-depth investigation is highly 
unattractive to firms. 
During the life of RAG 2007-13, over 100 individual aids were notified for assessment. In most cases 
DURXQGSHUFHQWIROORZLQJDFRQVLGHUDWLRQRI WKH µVFUHHQV¶ ± i.e. market share and capacity, the 
Commission raised no objections. In several cases where it was unable to assess market share or 
capacity, it opened the investigative procedure to make this assessment, but went ahead and 
approved the aid proposed having satisfied itself that the screens were not breached. In two cases, 
Dell Poland77 and Porsche Leipzig,78 the Commission proceeded to an in-depth analysis on the 
basis of its detailed guidelines.79 In both cases it reached a positive decision on the aid.  
In several cases, however, the prospect of an in-depth investigation has resulted in the notification 
being withdrawn. 6SDLQZLWKGUHZDQRWLILFDWLRQRISURSRVHGDLGWRWDOOLQJ¼PLOOLRQZKLFKLWSODQQHG
to grant to Ford España and instead the investment was implePHQWZLWKD ORZHUDLGDPRXQW¼
million) which was below the threshold requiring Commission approval. Other cases include 
Volkswagen/Audi in Hungary, Volkswagen in Germany, Linamar in Germany, Fiat in Poland and 
Revoz, a subsidiary of Renault/Nissan in Slovenia. The Commission has observed that, in the 
majority of these cases Member States granted substantially less aid than originally planned - which 
is possible without prior Commission scrutiny - without affecting the implementation of the 
investments, confirming its doubts about the necessity of the higher aid amounts.80 
The second strand to controlling large aid volumes has been the requirement to report all to 
investments exceeGLQJ¼PLOOLRQLUUHVSHFWLYHRIWKHDLGDPRXQWWKLVKDVEHHQUHTXLUHGVLQFH 
Commission data suggest that there have been approaching 500 such cases since the information 
was required to be reported, with cases heavily concentrated in a few Member States, most notably 
Germany, and to a lesser extent Poland, Hungary and Spain; some countries have no recorded 
regional aid to projects of this magnitude.  
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 Kai-Uwe Kühn (2012) Making State Aid Rules More Effective: the Reform of the Regional Aid Guidelines, 10th 
DQQXDO([SHUWV¶IRUXPRQ(XURSHDQ6tate Aid Law, Brussels, 7 June; Friederiszick, H. and Tosini, N. (2013) 
Implications of the State aid Modernisation for the Assessment of Large Investment Projects, European State Aid 
Law Quarterly, 1, pp46-60. 
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 Commission Decision of 23 September 2009 on the aid which Poland is planning to implement for Dell 
Products (Poland) Sp. z o.o., L29/8 of 2 February 2010. 
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 Commission Decision of 9 July 2014 on State aid SA 34118 which Germany is planning to implement in favour 
of Porsche Leipzig GmbH and Dr Ing.H.c.F.Porsche Aktiengeselleschaft, not yet published in the OJEU: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/245375/245375_1593128_166_2.pdf  
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 Communication from the Commission concerning the criteria for an in-depth assessment of regional aid to 
large investment projects [2009] OJ C 223/3. 
80
 Commission Press Release: State aid: Commission adopts four decisions on regional investment aid for car 
manufacturers Porsche, BMW, AUDI and Ford, 9 July 2014: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-
792_en.htm  
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Figure 12$LGWRHOLJLEOHLQYHVWPHQWVH[FHHGLQJ¼PLOOLRQ 
 2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  Total 
 ¼P No. ¼P No. ¼P No. ¼P No. ¼P No. ¼P No. ¼P No. ¼P No. ¼P No. ¼P No. ¼P No. ¼P No. No. 
AT -  -  14.1 1 -  7.1 1 -  -  3.3 1 -  4.0 1 5.3 1 -  5 
BE -  18.0 1 -  31.5 4 27.9 2 60.2 4 32.1 2 -  19.3 1 -  8.1 1 15.3 2 17 
BG -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.5 1 -  2.3 1 2 
CZ -  31.5 1 -  313.2 10 -  89.8 4 20.7 1 -  50.8 2 -  36.3 2 143.7 6 26 
DE 20.3 1 107.0 5 275.9 13 316.3 14 193.4 12 145.9 11 138.3 8 156.4 10 123.6 6 267.9 18 170.0 11 210.7 17 126 
ES 60.0 2 140.3 4 88.1 5 185.4 15 105.0 10 35.8 5 72.4 4 65.5 4 -  11.0 1 5.4 1 39.2 5 56 
FR -  -  18.4 1 33.3 5 20.7 3 7.2 3 1.1 1 -  -  -  1.5 2 -  15 
GR -  -  -  146.0 4 18.8 1 -  29.8 1 -  -  -  73.1 3 -  9 
HU -  71.3 3 223.7 10 277.6 11 78.8 6 218.0 10 133.8 6 85.4 4 35.9 1 26.7 1 125.7 6 149.3 6 64 
IE -  2.6 1 28.5 2 76.0 9 8.4 3 30.8 5 7.5 1 -  -  -  -  2.0 1 22 
IT -  88.9 3 -  78.7 3 -  -  48.6 3 36.1 2 -  26.9 2 -  -  13 
NL -  -  8.8 1 -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1 
PL -  32.2 1 82.6 5 65.9 3 128.9 8 165.6 7 97.0 4 72.2 4 241.3 11 259.8 11 26.7 2 81.4 4 60 
PT 69.4 1 11.5 1 51.8 3 200.8 9 -  29.7 1 68.6 4 23.9 1 14.3 1 36.5 2 15.1 1 -  24 
RO -  -  -  -  -  50.9 2 -  135.3 2 -  77.9 3 28.7 1 -  8 
SE -  -  4.9 1 -  -  -  -  -  10.7 1 -  -  -  2 
SK -  -  -  26.0 1 -  -  -  -  -  -  18.8 1 -  2 
UK -  7.3 1 39.0 5 42.7 4 -  25.9 2 54.6 4 51.9 5 16.6 2 12.5 2 63.2 6 58.4 5 36 
Total 149.7 4 510.5 21 835.7 47 1793.5 92 589.0 46 859.8 54 704.4 39 630.0 33 512.6 25 723.7 42 578.0 38 702.3 47 488 
Note: the figures refer to the aid amounts and the number of cases in each country annually. 
Source: Own calculations from European Commission reporting on transparency at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register/msf_2015.pdf  
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One quite interesting issue is how this might compare internationally. This is difficult to assess given 
data availability and problems of comparability. However, lobbying against so-cDOOHG µFRUSRUDWH
ZHOIDUH¶LQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVKDVUHVXOWHGLQDQLQFUHDVLQJDPRXQWRILQIRUPDWLRQEHFRPLQJDYDLODEOH
on subsidies to US firms. Figure 13 takes as its starting point the data presented in Figure 12. This 
LQYROYHVDLGDPRXQWVH[FHHGLQJ¼VRWKHVDPHPLQLPXPWKUHVKROGLVDSSOLHGWRDYDLODEOH86
data. Subsidies paid by the federal level are excluded so that only state, city and local subsidies are 
included. Also excluded are subsidy programmes that focus on specific objectives such as training, 
environmental protection and research and development. In short, the expenditure is filtered to 
included only those measures that aim at economic development and employment creation generally 
or development of disadvantaged areas and can be considered broadly comparable with the 
objectives of regional aid in Europe. 
Figure 13: Large regional aid spend in the EU and US 
 
Source: Own calculations from European Commission reporting on transparency at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register/msf_2015.pdf and Good Jobs First: 
http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/corporate-subsidy-watch  
Clearly there are significant issues associated with comparability. For example, the precise nature of 
many of the US measures is unclear, though it is known that tax incentives are widely used at city and 
State level. Nevertheless, the differences in level of spend are extremely striking. Since 2008, spend 
DPRQJ86 6WDWHDQGFLWLHVRQVXEVLGLHVH[FHHGLQJ ¼KDVJHQHUDOO\EHHQ LQ WKH UDQJH ¼
ELOOLRQWR¼ELOOLRQZKLOHVSHQGLQ(XURSHLQWKHVDPHSHULRGKDVEHHQLQWKHUDQJH¼ELOOLRQWR
¼ ELOOLRQ D IUDFWLRQ RI WKH DPRXQW ,Q VKRUW (XURSHDQ JRYHUQPHQWV PD\ EH FRQVLGHUDEO\ OHVV
profligate in their use of subsidies to firms than is frequently supposed. 
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4. DISCUSSION ISSUES 
This paper has provided an overview of the some of the recent developments in State aid control 
related to regional policy. The following questions are suggested as a basis for discussion at the 
(R53$SDUWQHUV¶PHHWLQJ 
(i) How is the new approach to support to large firmV LQ µF¶DUHDVZRUNLQJRXW LQSUDFWLFH"
How constraining are the new rules? Do you regard the treatment of regional aid to large 
firms as a settled matter? What further developments ± such as further clarification of the 
GBER, amendment of the GBER, decisions on individual cases under RAG 2014-20 do 
you anticipate? 
(ii) +RZLVWKHQHZ*%(5µVHWWOLQJLQ¶",VLWZRUNDEOH"+RZFRQWHQWDUH\RXZLWKWKHRSHUDWLRQ
of the new GBER? What do you see as the main challenges and how might they be 
resolved? 
(iii) What are your experiences with negotiating the evaluation plans for large schemes with 
the Commission? What are your views on the evaluation plans negotiated with the 
Commission? How do you think they will contribute to the future of development of policy? 
(iv) What do you see as the key emerging areas of controversy in economic development and 
State aid? Treatment of infrastructure? Use of financial instruments? Relationship 
between tax competition and State aid? 
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ANNEX I: POUR MEMOIRE ± KEY CHANGES IN REGIONAL AID 
CONTROL 2014-20 V 2007-13 
 
Scope 
The overall architecture of the RAG and the GBER remains substantially the same: the RAG sets out 
the parameters for maps and award rates as well as the criteria for assessing notifiable aid. The 
GBER provides the basis for exempting aid from prior notification and approval. However, the scope 
of the GBER is widened to include the following regional aid types that previously had to be notified 
and approved: 
o Ad hoc aid provided that meets the all the relevant conditions (save that it is not a 
µVFKHPH¶81 
o Aid for outward transport within the Member State in the Outermost and sparsely-
populated regions 
o Aid for inward transport within the Member State 
                                                   
81
 GBER 2014-20, Article 3. 
Scope: 
GBER filters out more regional aid schemes and ad hoc aid 
Assisted area coverage: 
Higher overall - lower for 'a' regions and higher for 'c' areas 
Rates of award: 
Generally lowered for all eligible regions 
Large firms:  
6WULFWHUSURMHFWHOLJLELOLW\FULWHULDLQµF¶DUHDV 
Evaluation:  
Potential condition for aid approval 
Cohesion policy: 
Stronger links with EU Cohesion policy objectives 
Transparency: 
More monitoring, reporting and scrutiny 
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Figure 14: The architecture of regional aid control 
 
Assisted area coverage 
Figure 2 illustrates the impact of RAG 2014-20 on spatial coverage. At the EU level, the most striking 
point to note is that, while overall coverage increases by around one percentage point, there is a 
pronounced shift in the composition of this coverage ± ZLWKµD¶UHJLRQFRYHUDJHIDOOLQJIURPDURXQG
SHUFHQWWRVRPHSHUFHQWRIWKH(8SRSXODWLRQDQGµF¶DUHDVULVLQJIURPXQGHUSHUFHQWWRRYHU
22 percent. At country level, patterns of change vary widely. 
Looking at reductions in coverage: in relative WHUPV WKH ELJJHVW µORVHU¶ LV Luxembourg, where 
coverage is halved. In absolute terms, the biggest loser is Hungary, which loses over 23 percent of 
existing coverage (down from 100 percent to under 77 percent). Finland and Sweden each lose 
around 20 percent of current coverage. Germany sees a reduction of almost four percentage points, 
EXWDOVRVLJQLILFDQWLVWKDWQR*HUPDQUHJLRQKDVµD¶VWDWXVIURP-XO\ 
Turning to increases in coverage: tKHELJJHVW µZLQQHU¶ LQ relative terms is France, which sees an 
increase in existing coverage of over 30 percent. In absolute terms, the main gains are in Portugal 
and Spain ± where coverage increases by 8.3 and 9 percentage points respectively. Austria, 
Belgium and the United Kingdom see coverage increase by around three to four percentage points. 
Perhaps as important as changes in coverage, at least for some countries, are changes in the 
composition of that coverage, with several Member States seeing a significant VKLIWIURPµD¶UHJLRQ
WRµF¶DUHD coverage, even if overall coverage does not change significantly or at all. This is illustrated 
in Figure 15. This shows that: 
x in Germany there is both a reduction in overall population coverage and a reduction in the 
QXPEHURIµD¶Uegions; 
x LQ VRPH FRXQWULHV RYHUDOO FRYHUDJH KDV UHPDLQHG VDPH EXW IHZHU UHJLRQV TXDOLI\ DV µD¶
regions (Greece, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia),  
x LQRWKHUVRYHUDOO FRYHUDJHKDV IDOOHQEXW WKHHOLJLEOH µD¶ UHJLRQVKDYH UHPDLQHG WKHVDPH
(Hungary, Italy, Czech Republic, Slovakia). However, only in Hungary is the reduction 
RAG ± overarching framework 
Maps 
Aid rates 
Sectoral 
scope 
Key 
conditions 
GBER ± presumed compliance 
Transparency 
Aid type 
Maximum aid 
Sectors 
Projects 
RAG ± notification and 
compatibility assessment 
Non-GBER 
individual aid 
Non-GBER aid 
schemes 
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significant; in the remaining countries the reduction is very small and simply a result of 
demographic change rather than de-designation 
Figure 15: Impact of RAG 2014-RQSRSXODWLRQFRYHUDJHDQGµD¶UHJLRQHOLJLELOLW\ 
 Overall population coverage (%) 
Lower Same Higher 
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LRQ
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Figure 16: Population coverage 2007-13 and 2014-20 (% of total) 
 
Note: 2007-13 figures in fact relate to 2011-13, i.e. following the 2010 review when Statistical effect areas were re-GHVLJQDWHGDVµIXOO¶µD¶UHJLRQVRUµF¶DUHDV 
Source: RAG 2007-13, RAG 2014-20 and own calculations from Eurostat data, 
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Rates of award 
RAG 2014-20 reduces aid intensities across the board, except for the very poorest regions and the 
sparsely-populated areas. The main maximum aid intensities are shown in Figure 17 along with rates 
under RAG 2007-13 (Figure 18).  
Figure 17: RAG 2014-20 0D[LPXPDLGLQWHQVLWLHVµVWDQGDUG¶PDWUL[JURVVJUDQW-equivalent 
 Large firms Medium-sized 
firms 
Small firms 
µD¶UHJLRQV*'3SHUKHDG(8DY 50% 60% 70% 
µD¶UHJLRQV*'3SHUKHDG(8DY 35% 45% 55% 
µD¶UHJLRQV*'3SHUKHDG(8DY 25% 35% 45% 
µF¶DUHDV± H[µD¶UHJLRQVXQWLO 15% 25% 35% 
µF¶DUHDV± sparsely populated/border 15% 25% 35% 
µF¶DUHDV 10% 20% 30% 
Note: ALGWRODUJHILUPVLQµF¶DUHDVLVUHVWULFWHGWRFHUWDLQW\SHVRILQYHVWPHQWVRWKDWLQSUDFWLFHD]HURUDWHwill 
often apply. Rates for OMRs and other specific cases are omitted. 
Source: RAG 2014-20, para 171-177. 
Figure 18: RAG 2007-0D[LPXPDLGLQWHQVLWLHVµVWDQGDUG¶PDWUL[JURVVJUDQW-equivalent 
 Large firms Medium-sized 
firms 
Small firms 
µD¶UHJLRQV*'3SHUKHDG(8DY 50% 60% 70% 
µD¶UHJLRQV*'3SHUKHDG(8DY 40% 50% 60% 
µD¶UHJLRQV*'3SHUKHDG(8DY 30% 40% 50% 
µF¶DUHDV± sparsely populated/border 15% 25% 35% 
µF¶DUHDV 15%/10% 25%/20% 35%/30% 
Note: Rates for OMRs and other specific cases are omitted. 
Source: RAG 2007-13, para 44-48. 
Direct comparisons are complicated because WKHUDWH µEDQGV¶DUHDGMXVWHGWRUHIOHFW enlargement to 
EU27 and the economic performance of different regions has anyway not been uniform. 
Nevertheless, maps produced by DG COMP (see Figure 19 and Figure 20) illustrate the combined 
HIIHFWVRIWKHVHFKDQJHVHVSHFLDOO\LQµD¶UHJLRQV)RUH[DPSOH 
x Rates in eastern Germany were 20-30 percent in 2007-13, but typically fall to 15 percent in 
2014-17 and to 10 percent in 2018-20 (see Figure 21). A key point to note here is that this 
DULVHV IURP WKHVKLIW IURP µD¶ UHJLRQ WR µF¶ DUHDVWDWXVZKLFKDOVRKDVDQ LPSDFWRQHOLJLEOH
investment for large firms 
x Similarly in SpainRQO\(VWUHPDGXUDUHWDLQVµD¶VWDWXV; here the rate falls from 40 percent in 
2007-13 to 25 percent for 2014-20. Elsewhere in Spain, where a rate of 30 percent aid 
LQWHQVLW\DSSOLHGLQµD¶UHJLRQVWKHVHUHJLRQVQRZKDYHµF¶VWDWXVDQGUDWHVIDOOWRSHUFHQWLQ
2014-17 and again to 10 percent in 2018 to 2020. 
x In Poland, the less prosperous regions in the east retain a maximum 50 percent rate, but 
elsewhere rates become more differentiated. In ĝOąskie and DolnoĞOąskie, for example, the 
maximum has fallen from 40 percent to 25 percent. However, in much of the capital region, 
0D]RZLHFNLHDSHUFHQWUDWHDSSOLHVHYHQWKRXJKWKHUHJLRQDVDZKROHQRZKDVµF¶DUHD
status. This is because Mazowieckie adjoins areas with a 50 percent rate, so the provisions 
5HFHQWGHYHORSPHQWVLQ&RPSHWLWLRQSROLF\DQGUHJLRQDODLGDGMXVWLQJWRDµQHZQRUPDO¶ 
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on a maximum aid differential of 15 percent apply.82 However, the more restrictive eligibility 
FULWHULDIRUODUJHILUPVLQµF¶DUHDVVWLOODSSO\LQ0D]RZLHFNLH 
x Similarly, in the Czech Republic a maximum rate of 25 percent applies through the eligible 
areas whereas most of the country was previously eligible for a maximum of 40 percent and 
in Italy maximum rates in the Mezzogiorno fall from 30 percent to 25 percent. 
x In some areas the maximum rate reductions are more substantial ± in Estonia, Lithuania and 
the capital region of Bulgaria rates have fallen from a maximum of 50 in 2007-13 to 25 
percent in 2014-20. 
Figure 19: Regional aid ceilings 2007-13 
 
Source: DG COMP 
Overall, these changes are in line with the long term trend of reducing award values; the present 
situation contrasts sharply with the pre-2000 period where maximum rates of award were as high as 
75 percent net JUDQWHTXLYDOHQWLQµD¶UHJLRQVDQGSHUFHQWQHWJUDQWHTXLYDOHQWLQµF¶DUHDV 
                                                   
82
 RAG 2014-20, para 176. 
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Figure 20: Regional aid ceilings 2014-17 
 
Source: DG COMP. 
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Figure 21: Regional aid ceilings 2018-20 
 
Large firms 
7KHHOLJLELOLW\RIODUJHILUPVIRUUHJLRQDODLGLQµF¶DUHDs was one of the most controversial aspects of 
the negotiations of the RAG and the GBER. Initially, the Commission had wanted to exclude this 
possibility altogether but protracted negotiations resulted in a compromise whereby such firms are 
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only eligible fRUUHJLRQDODLGXQGHUWKH*%(5IRUµLQLWLDOLQYHVWPHQWLQIDYRXURIQHZHFRQRPLFDFWLYLW\¶
In principle, this aims to exclude expansion projects, but allow setting-up projects. In between there is 
VRPH VFRSH IRU µGLYHUVLILFDWLRQ¶ WR EH VXSSRUWHG HLWKHU XQder the GBER or potentially following a 
notification and assessment under the RAG. The precise contours of these definitions have been the 
subject of some debate and attempts at clarification by the Commission services, but the main point 
here is to emphasise the very significant reduction in the scope to assist large firms with existing 
DFWLYLWLHVLQµF¶DUHDV 
Evaluation 
The emphasis on evaluation of regional aid policy is new. GBER 2014-20 provides for the expiry of 
GBER cover after six months for schemHVZLWKDQQXDOEXGJHWVH[FHHGLQJ¼PLOOLRQSHQGLQJWKH
approval by the Commission of an appropriate evaluation plan. Regional aid schemes reported by 
several countries have already been subjected to this requirement.  
RAG 2014-20 enables the Commission to limit the validity of aid schemes to four years in order for an 
evaluation to be carried out.83 The precise terms required of an evaluation84 would be defined in the 
approval of the aid measure. However, they must be carried out in sufficient time for the results to 
feed in to the Commission decision on any extension of the scheme proposed, or at expiry.85  
Cohesion policy 
Since the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds relations between Cohesion policy and Competition 
control of regional aid have often been strained. Historically, this has been particularly so in context of 
assisted area coverage, and the lack of coincidence between the EU Cohesion policy and national 
assisted area maps. However, this has been less controversial since 2000, when Member States 
gained greater flexibility in choosing both sets of areas, and especially since 2007, when Cohesion 
policy ceased to be spatially restricted. In this context, the interface between Cohesion policy and the 
GBER is now of more relevance than relations with the RAG. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note a 
greater degree of coordination between RAG 2014-20 and the objectives of Cohesion policy. This is 
reflected in the explicit use of Cohesion policy criteria in State aid compatibility assessments and in 
the specific provisions made for territorial cooperation and regional urban aid. 
Transparency 
Transparency obligations are included in the common assessment criteria for notified aid.86 These 
include online publication of the full text of the aid scheme, its implementing provisions and award 
data, notably names of beneficiaries, aid amounts and intensities. In principle, Member States were 
already required to provide online information on aid schemes approved under the GBER, though in 
practice the links to such information have often been poorly maintained and the information limited in 
detail. Reporting was required under RAG 2007-13 for aid to all large projects (those involving 
investment exceeGLQJ¼PLOOLRQLUUHVSHFWLYHRIWKHDPRXQWRIDLG5$*-20 extends this to all 
                                                   
83
 RAG 2014-20, para 27. 
84
 See also: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/modernisation/evaluation_issues_paper_en.pdf 
85
 RAG 2014-20, para 144. 
86
 RAG 2014-20, para 141.  
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SURMHFWV DQG UHTXLUHV DLG DZDUGV H[FHHGLQJ ¼ PLOOLRQ WR EH UHSRUWHG WR WKH &RPPLVVLRQ ZLWKLQ 
days of the award.87  
Under GBER 2014-20, Member States are required to develop websites providing information on the 
implementation of the GBER by 30 June 2016 - two years from the entry into force of the Regulation. 
More specifically, the GBER requires the publication on a comprehensive State aid website at 
national or regional level of: 88 
x the summary information set out in a standardised format or a link providing access to that 
information; 
x the full text of each aid measure or a link providing access to it; 
x LQIRUPDWLRQRQHDFKLQGLYLGXDODLGDZDUGH[FHHGLQJ¼ 
Early indications are that the Commission will reinforce its monitoring of compliance. 
  
                                                   
87
 RAG 2014-20, para 193. 
88
 GBER 2014-20, Article 9. 
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ANNEX II: NATIONAL ASSISTED AREA MAPS 2014-20 
Assisted Areas in Austria 2014-20 
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Assisted Areas in Finland 2014-20 
Aid Area 1  
Article 107(3)(c) 
predefined 
Central Ostrobothnia 
Kainuu 
Lapland 
Northern Karelia 
Northern Ostrobothnia 
Northern Savonia 
Southern Savonia 
Aid Area 2 
Article 107(3)(c) 
non-predefined 
Salo 
Äänekoski 
Viiitasaari 
Pihtipudas 
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Assisted Areas in France 2014-20 
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Assisted Areas in Germany 2014 
 
Source: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy 
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Assisted Areas in Norway 2014-20 (Investment Aid) 
 
 
5HFHQWGHYHORSPHQWVLQ&RPSHWLWLRQSROLF\DQGUHJLRQDODLGDGMXVWLQJWRDµQHZQRUPDO¶ 
European Policies Research Paper No. 92 49 European Policies Research Centre 
Assisted Areas in Poland 2014-20 
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Assisted Areas in Sweden 2014-20 
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Assisted Areas in the United Kingdom 2014-20 
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ANNEX III: GBER 2014-20 AID SCHEMES FEATURING 
µ5(*,21$/$,' 
Country / scheme name 
Annual 
budget 
¼P 
Case code 
Austria 
  
 *XLGHOLQHV³,QYHVWPHQWVXSSRUW± WUDGHLQGXVWU\´$ktionsrichtlinie 
"Investitionsbeihilfen - Gewerbe / Industrie") 12.0 SA.40516 
*XLGHOLQHV³.H\VXSSRUWIRUWRXULVPDQGOHLVXUHHFRQRP\´
(Aktionsrichtlinie "Schwerpunktförderung der Tourismus- und 
Freizeitwirtschaft") 
10.0 SA.40585 
aws guidelines on guarantees 2014 (aws-Garantierichtlinie 2014) 75.0 SA.39530 
aws guidelines on guarantees 2014 (aws-Garantierichtlinien 2014) 75.0 SA.39174 
ecoplus guideline for regional investment support in firms (ecoplus 
Richtlinien für die regionale betriebliche Investitionsförderung in 
Niederösterreich) 
15.0 SA.39888 
ERP Tourism Programme (ERP-Tourismusprogramm (Teil: 
Regionalbeihilfen)) 1.0 SA.39523 
ERP Regional Programme (ERP-Regionalprogramm) 10.0 SA.32294 
ERP Regional Programme 2015 (ERP-Regionalprogramm (Fassung 
1.1.2015)) 5.0 SA.40903 
ERP Tourism Programme 2015 (ERP-Tourismusprogramm (Fassung 
1.1.2015)) 2.0 SA.40905 
Lower Austria's Agency for the Promotion of Border Regions 
(Förderungsaktion der Niederösterreichischen 
Grenzlandförderungsgesellschaft mbH) 
2.2 SA.39886 
Frontrunner Initiative (Frontrunner-Initiative) 5.0 SA.36899 
aws guarantees for SME (Garantieübernahmen der aws gemäß KMU-
Förderungsgesetz, Förderungsrichtlinie des Bundesministeriums für 
Wissenschaft, Forschung und Wirtschaft im Einvernehmen mit dem 
Bundesministerium für Finanzen) 
50.0 SA.39569 
Innovations- und Wachstumsprogramm des Landes Oberösterreich für 
die oö.Tourismus- und Freizeitwirtschaft für den Zeitraum bis 
31.12.2020. 
2.8 SA.40449 
Innovations- und Wachstumsprogramm für die oberösterreichische 
Wirtschaft (IWW) bis 30.06.2020 6.5 SA.40942 
KWF framework guidelines (KWF-Rahmenrichtlinie) 20.0 SA.39275 
KWF framework guidelines version 2.0-14 (KWF-Rahmenrichtlinie v.2.0-
14) 20.0 SA.41047 
.:)JXLGHOLQHVÄILQDQFLDOVXSSRUW³.:)-Richtlinie "Finanzierung") 4.0 SA.39274 
Guidelines for Styrian promotion of economic development 2014-20 
(Richtlinie für die Steirische Wirtschaftsförderung 2014-2020) 100.0 SA.39283 
Specific guidelines of the Lower Austrian Fund for Business and 
Tourism for the assumption of guarantees (Spezielle Richtlinien des NÖ 
Wirtschafts- und Tourismusfonds für die Übernahme von Bürgschaften) 
7.6 SA.39582 
Specific guidelines of the Lower Austrian Fund for Business and 
Tourism for shareholding (Spezielle Richtlinien des NÖ Wirtschafts- und 
Tourismusfonds/ des Landes Niederösterreich für Beteiligungen im 
Rahmen des Niederösterreichischen Beteiligungsmodelles) 
1.2 SA.39581 
Standard guarantees in the context of the Upper Austrian KGG 
guidelines (Standardbürgschaften im Rahmen der Bürgschaftsrichtlinien 
der OÖ KGG) 
15.0 SA.40964 
7\UROHDQVSHFLDOVXSSRUWSURJUDPPHIRUSODQQLQJUHJLRQÄ2EHUHVXQG
2EHUVWHV*HULFKW³-14 (Tiroler Sonderförderungsprogramm Oberes 
und Oberstes Gericht Regionalwirtschaftliches Programm für den 
PlanuQJVYHUEDQGÄ2EHUHVXQG2EHUVWHV*HULFKW³± Tiroler 
Sonderförderungsprogramm 2015-2024) 
1.0 SA.40308 
TOP Tourism Impulse Support 2014-20 (TOP-Tourismus-Impuls- 19.2 SA.39148 
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Annual 
budget 
¼P 
Case code 
Förderung 2014-2020, Teil A und Teil B) 
Assumption of liabilities in the tourism and leisure economy 2014-20 
(Übernahme von Haftungen für die Tourismus- und Freizeitwirtschaft 
2014-2020) 
0.6 SA.39149 
Guidelines on aws grants according the law on SME support 
(Zuschussrichtlinie der aws gemäß KMU-Förderungsgesetz, 
Förderungsrichtlinie des Bundesministeriums für Wissenschaft, 
Forschung und Wirtschaft im Einvernehmen mit dem Bundesministerium 
für Finanzen) 
6.0 SA.39568 
Finland 
   
Business Development Grant (Yrityksen kehittämisavustus) Business 
Environment Development Grant (Yritysten toimintaympäristön 
kehittämisavustus)  
50.0 SA.39643 
France 
   
Regional Development Grant (Prime d'aménagement du territoire 
pour l'industrie et les services) 30.0 SA.39746 
5HJLRQDO$LGµ8PEUHOOD¶6FKHPHIRU-2020 (Régime cadre 
exempté de notification relatif aux aides à finalité régionale (AFR) 
pour la période 2014-2020) 
130.0 SA.39252 
Germany 
   
)HGHUDO*XLGHOLQHVIRUWKH5XUDO%DQN¶VIHGHUDOIXQGLQJ5LFKWOLQLHQ
über die Verwendung des Zweckvermögens des Bundes bei der 
Landwirtschaftlichen Rentenbank) 
15.0 SA.40407 
Federal: Innovation support programme (GBER) (Bund: Programm zur 
Innovationsförderung, AGVO) 36.0 SA.41003 
Federal guarantees and Land guarantees in the new Lãnder and Berlin 
(Bundesbürgschaften unter Einbindung paralleler Landesbürgschaften 
für Investitions- und Betriebsmittelkredite zugunsten von Vorhaben in 
den neuen Bundesländern und im Regionalfördergebiet Berlin) 
20.0 SA.39140 
Federal-Länder Joint Task for the Improvement of Regional 
Economic Structures (GRW) ± (Bund-Länder-
Gemeinschaftsaufgabe "Verbesserung der regionalen 
Wirtschaftsstruktur" (GRW) - gewerbliche Wirtschaft, 
einschließlich gemeinnützige außeruniversitäre wirtschaftsnahe 
Forschungseinrichtungen) 
900.0 SA.39463 
Guarantees of Land Lower Saxony (Bürgschaften des Landes 
Niedersachsen) 50.0 SA.33431 
Guarantee programme of Land Saxony (Bürgschaftsprogramm des 
Freistaates Sachsen) 4.0 SA.40758 
Electro-mobility: positioning the new value added chain, Electro Power 
(ELEKTROmobilität: Positionierung der neuen Wertschöpfungskette, 
ELEKTRO POWER) 
25.0 SA.39114 
Land guarantees for investment and business operating capital for 
businesses in Land Mecklenburg West Pomerania (Landesbürgschaften 
für Investitions- und Betriebsmittelkredite zugunsten von Unternehmen 
der gewerblichen Wirtschaft in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern) 
20.0 SA.40550 
Saarland guidelines for business guarantees (Richtlinie des Saarlandes 
für die Übernahme von Bürgschaften, Garantien und sonstigen 
Gewährleistungen im Bereich der gewerblichen Wirtschaft) 
15.0 SA.40684 
*XLGHOLQHVRI/DQG6D[RQ\¶V0LQLVWU\IRUWKH(QYLURQPHQWDQG
Agriculture on the granting of funding for measures aimed at increasing 
energy efficiency and climate protection in Land Saxony (Funding 
guidelines on climate protection ± RL Climate/2014) (Richtlinie des 
Sächsischen Staatsministeriums für Umwelt und Landwirtschaft über die 
Gewährung von Fördermitteln für Maßnahmen zur Steigerung der 
Energieeffizienz und zum Klimaschutz im Freistaat Sachsen 
(Förderrichtlinie Klimaschutz ± RL Klima/2014)) 
6.4 SA.40656 
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*XLGHOLQHVRQHQHUJ\IXQGLQJLQWKHFRQWH[WRI/DQG+HVVH¶VHQHUJ\ODZ
(Richtlinie zur energetischen Förderung im Rahmen des Hessischen 
Energiegesetzes) 
2.2 SA.40232 
Federal and Land counter-guarantees for guarantee banks and 
guarantee companies (Rückbürgschaften und Rückgarantien des 
Bundes und der Länder für die Bürgschaftsbanken und 
Garantiegesellschaften) 
20.0 SA.39134 
Federal and Land counter-guarantees for participation guarantees 
issued by the guarantee banks using the premium subsidy model (PSM) 
(Rückgarantien des Bundes und der Länder zu Beteiligungsgarantien 
der Bürgschaftsbanken unter Anwendung des Prämienzuschussmodells 
(PZM)) 
45.0 SA.39144 
Saxony: Rural development measures for integrated rural development 
under the GAK Framework plan (Sachsen: Ländliche Entwicklung (LE) 
Maßnahmen der Integrierten Ländlichen Entwicklung nach GAK-
Rahmenplan) 
4.5 SA.40446 
Saxony: (LEADER implementation of projects in the cotext of the 
LEADER development strategies; projects for interregional and 
transnational cooperation in the Local Action Groups (LAG) 
(Sachsen:LEADER Durchführung der Vorhaben im Rahmen der 
LEADER-Entwicklungsstrategien; Vorhaben für gebietsübergreifende 
und transnationale Kooperationen in den Lokalen Aktionsgruppen 
(LAG)) 
10.9 SA.40445 
ERP Regional aid programme (ERP Regionalförderprogramm) 300 SA.38707 
Italy 
   
Agreements for competitiveness ± Public call for firms that passed the 
first stage scrutiny  20.8 SA.39395 
Aids for micro and small firms for investments relating to the innovation 
of productive processes (Micro call ± 2015 edition) 7.0 SA.40819 
Aids for SMEs for investments relating to innovation, environmental 
sustainability and safety in the worlplace (SME call ± 2015 edition) 10.0 SA.40818 
Aids for firms operating in the Tuscan territory for the initial training, re-
TXDOLILFDWLRQDQGXSGDWLQJRIHPSOR\HHV¶VNLOOV 6.4 SA.40520 
Lifelong learning call ± Phase III 15.0 SA.39394 
Support to SMEs for the participation to Expo Milan 2015 0.8 SA.40632 
Tax credit for firms subscribing programme agreements in polluted sites 
of national interest  35.0 SA.40412 
Regulation of region Apulia relating to aids under exemption (regional 
aids, Regional Regulation no. 17 of 30.09.2014 (RPOJ 06.10.2014) 98.0 SA.39759 
Netherlands 
 
 
Subsidieregeling Regionale Investeringssteun Groningen 2014 (RIG 
2014) 10.0 SA.39721 
Poland 
 
 
Regional aid program granted to entrepreneurs operating in 
special economic zones on the basis of permits issued during the 
period from 25 December 2014- 31 December 2020. 
527.0 SA.40523 
The program of regional investment aid - 6WDUJDUG6]F]HFLĔVNL 1.5 SA.39770 
5HVROXWLRQ1R/;,9:URFáDZ&LW\&RXQFLORI2FWREHU
2014. 27.1 SA.40339 
5HVROXWLRQ1R/;,9:URFáDZ&LW\&RXQFLORI2FWREHU
2014. 12.3 SA.40338 
5HVROXWLRQ1R/;,9:URFáDZ&LW\&RXQFLORI2FWREHU
2014. 12.3 SA.40340 
5HVROXWLRQ1R/;,9:URFáDZ&LW\&RXQFLORI2FWREHU
2014. 12.3 SA.40542 
Resolution No. XLVIII / 392/14 Commune Rawicz City Council of 
24.09.2014 r  0.1 SA.39771 
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Financial assistance to employers conducting workshops for the 
disabled from the State Fund for Rehabilitation of Disabled Persons na SA.40693 
Reimbursement of additional costs of employing disabled workers na SA.40694 
Financial aid granted by the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development 
to support innovative centres under the Operational Programme 
Innovative Economy 2007-2013 
na SA.40518 
Monthly grant of compensation of employees with disabilities na SA.40525 
Granting aid for consultancy services related to preparation of the initial 
investment and aid for advisory services related to the implementation of 
the initial investment in the regional operational programs adopted for 
the period 2007-2013 (Dz. U. Pos. 1697) 
na SA.40789 
granting of regional investment aid, aid for consultancy services related 
to preparation of the initial investment and aid for advisory services 
related to the implementation of the initial investment for urban 
development funds in the regional operational programs adopted 2007-
2013 (Dz. U. pos. 1699) 
na SA.40790 
Reimbursement of the costs of training workers with disabilities na SA.40691 
Granting by the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development financial aid 
for the support of innovative centers under the Operational Programme 
Development of Eastern Poland, 2007-2013 
na SA.40793 
Conditions and procedure of granting state aid and de minimis aid 
through the National Research and Development Centre na SA.41471 
On the conditions for granting exemptions from property tax and tax on 
means of transport, accounting for regional investment aid, aid for 
culture and heritage conservation, aid for sports infrastructure and multi-
purpose recreational infrastructure and support for local infrastructure 
(Dz. U. of 2015. pos. 174) 
na SA.41495 
Regional investment state aid for the purposes of environmental 
protection specified by Regulation of the Minister of Environment on 
detailed conditions for granting regional state aid for investments in the 
field of environmental protection 
na SA.41730 
Support for fundamental research, industrial research, experimental 
development and feasibility studies in the regional operational programs 
for 2014-2020 
na SA.42839 
Financial aid granted by the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development 
under Axis and entrepreneurial Eastern Poland Eastern Poland 
Operational Programme 2014-2020 
na SA.42798 
Portugal 
 
 
Contractual tax benefits regime for productive investment 45.0 SA.39992 
Fiscal Regime for Investment Support (Regime fiscal de apoio ao 
investimento) 41.0 SA.39993 
Incentive Scheme for Regional Competitiveness in Azores 
(COMPETIR+) 22.0 SA.42245 
Incentive Scheme for Business Innovation (SI Inovação 
empresarial) 350.0 SA.42136 
United Kingdom 
 
 
Business Premises Renovation Allowance 67.3 SA.40156 
Coventry and Warwickshire Growing Places 5.5 SA.38649 
Coventry Investment Fund 27.5 SA.38594 
Doncaster Aid for Land and Property 2.7 SA.40731 
Enterprise Ready Fund 8.2 SA.39649 
First-year allowances for expenditure on plant and machinery in 
designated assisted areas 37.1 SA.40157 
Highlands and Islands Enterprise, General Block Exemption 
Scheme 2014-2020. 27.5 SA.39220 
Nottinghamshire Economic Development Capital Fund 
 
SA.38617 
Scottish Enterprise Regional and SME Investment Aid Scheme 48.0 SA.39217 
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2014 ± 2020 
Scottish Local Authority Support of Regional Investment, SME 
Investment and Employment Aid 6.9 SA.39213 
Selective Financial Assistance Scheme(Northern Ireland) 68.6 SA.39233 
The English Aid for disadvantaged workers and for workers with 
disabilities State Aid scheme 171.6 SA.39062 
The English Regional Aid scheme 135.9 SA.39211 
The English Training Aid State Aid scheme 171.6 SA.39061 
Welsh Government Capital Investment and Employment Aid Scheme 137.3 SA.39086 
Welsh Government Property Development Grant Scheme 68.6 SA.39138 
Welsh Local Government Capital Investment Aid & Employment Aid 
Scheme 41.2 SA.39123 
 
  
Norway 
   
Telemark development fund 3.2 GBER55/14/REG 
Start-up aid scheme 48.6 GBER41/14/RDI 
Biorefining aid scheme 15.1 GBER38/14/ENV 
Competence and development of the tourist industry 16.2 GBER37/14/TRA 
Regional development aid scheme 86.4 GBER25/14/REG 
Financial support for restructuring in Meloy municipality 1.3 GBER17/14/REG 
Regional transport aid 3.2 GBER11/14/REG 
Regional investment aid 32.4 GBER10/14/REG 
Note: (i) This is based on information available at August 2015; it is not clear how quickly reported schemes are 
added to the DG COMP database. (ii) The listing for France exclude schemes for the DépartementVG¶2XWUH0HU 
Source: DG COMP database: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?clear=1&policy_area_id=3 
and EFTA Surveillance Authority State aid register: http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/ and 
national sources where available. 
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EORPA RESEARCH 
This report was prepared by the European Policies Research Centre (EPRC) under the aegis of 
EoRPA (European Regional Policy Research Consortium), which is a grouping of national 
government authorities from countries across Europe. The Consortium provides sponsorship for 
EPRC to undertake regular monitoring and comparative analysis of the regional policies of European 
countries and the inter-relationships with EU Cohesion and Competition policies. Over the past year, 
EoRPA members have comprised the following partners: 
Austria 
x Bundeskanzleramt (Federal Chancellery), Vienna 
 
Finland 
x Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriö (Ministry of Employment and the Economy), Helsinki 
 
France 
x &RPPLVVDULDW*pQpUDOjO¶(JDOLWpGHVWHUULWRLUHV*HQHUDO&RPPLVVDULDWIRU7HUULWRULDO(TXDOLW\
CGET, previously DATAR), Paris 
 
Germany 
x Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and 
Energy), Berlin 
x Ministerium für Wissenschaft und Wirtschaft (Ministry of Science and Economic Affairs), 
Sachsen-Anhalt 
Italy 
x Dipartimento per lo Sviluppo e la Coesione economica (Department for Development and 
Economic Cohesion), Agenzia per la coesione territoriale (Agency for Territorial Cohesion), 
Rome 
 
Netherlands 
x Ministerie van Economische Zaken (Ministry of Economic Affairs), The Hague 
 
Norway 
x Kommunal- og moderniseringsdepartementet (Ministry of Local Government and 
Modernisation), Oslo 
 
Poland 
x Ministerstwo Infrastruktury i Rozwoju (Ministry of Infrastructure and Development), Warsaw 
 
Sweden 
x Näringsdepartementet (Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation), Stockholm 
 
Switzerland 
x Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft (SECO, State Secretariat for Economic Affairs), Bern 
United Kingdom 
x Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, London 
x Scottish Government, Glasgow 
The research for the country reviews was undertaken by EPRC in consultation with EoRPA partners. 
It involved a programme of desk research and fieldwork visits among national and regional authorities 
in sponsoring countries during the first half of 2015. The EoRPA research programme is coordinated 
by Professor John Bachtler, Fiona Wishlade, Dr Sara Davies and Heidi Vironen. 
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meeting of the EoRPA Regional Policy Research Consortium at Ross Priory, Loch Lomondside, 4-6 
October 2015. 
The country reviews were edited by an EPRC team led by Dr Sara Davies and also comprising 
Patricia Robertson, Heidi Vironen, Stephen Miller and Timothee Lehuraux. Country-specific research 
was contributed by the following research team:  
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Belgium: Timothee Lehuraux and Dr Arno van der 
Zwet, EPRC 
Lithuania: Jonas Jatkauskas and Giedrơ
6WRQ\Wơ, BGI Consulting 
Bulgaria: Prof Julia Spiridonova, ProlnfraConsult Luxembourg: Timothee Lehuraux, EPRC 
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3URI0DMD)UHGRWRYLü%ODQNDâLPXQGLüDQG
9LQNR0XãWUD8QLYHUVLW\RI6SOLW Malta: Stefan Kah, EPRC 
Cyprus: Funda Bozkaya and  
Patricia Robertson, EPRC Associates Netherlands: Dr Arno Van der Zwet, EPRC 
Czech Republic: Dr Lucie Jungwiertová, Charles 
University Norway: Fiona Wishlade, EPRC 
Denmark: Heidi Vironen, EPRC 
 
Poland: Dr Martin Ferry, EPRC 
Estonia: Dr Kristiina Tõnnisson, University of Tartu 
 
Portugal: Dr Carlos Mendez, EPRC 
Finland: Heidi Vironen, EPRC Romania: Neculai-Cristian Surubaru, EPRC Associate 
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Slovakia: Martin Obuch, Consulting 
Associates, s.r.o. 
Germany: Dr Sara Davies, EPRC 6ORYHQLD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